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ARTICLE 
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND 
THE HEARSAY RULE: 
WHAT HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS ARE TESTIMONIAL? 
By: The Honorable Paul W. Grimm,· 
Jerome E. Deise,·· and John R. Grimm··· 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a natural tension between the Confrontation Clause's requirement that a criminal defendant be "confronted with the 
witnesses against him"\ and the hearsay rule's tolerance of statements 
made by declarants who are not present at trial. 2 Although most hearsay 
rules allow a declarant to be unavailable, and some even require it,3 only 
one federal hearsay exception4 and several Maryland exceptions require a 
* The Honorable Paul W. Grimm is the Chief United States Magistrate Judge for the 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland. He was appointed to the court in 
February 1997. Judge Grimm received an A.B., summa cum laude, from the University of 
California, Davis, and graduated magna cum laude from the University of New Mexico 
School of Law. Judge Grimm retired as a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve. He 
has written numerous books and articles on evidence, civil procedure, and trial practice, and 
currently serves as an adjunct faculty member at the University of Baltimore and University of 
Maryland Schools of Law. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors themselves, 
and do not purport to be those of the federal judiciary, or the District of Maryland. 
** Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. Professor Deise received a B.A. 
from the University of Maryland, College Park, and a J.D. from the University of Baltimore 
School of Law. He teaches Evidence, Criminal Law, Comparative Professional 
Responsibility, Trial Evidence, Trial Adv0cacy, and Advanced Trial Advocacy at the 
University of Maryland School of Law. In 2004, he was the recipient of the prestigious 
Richard S. Jacobsen Award for Excellence in Teaching Trial Advocacy, a national award 
given annually to an outstanding law professor "who exemplifies the best attributes of the trial 
lawyer as teacher, mentor and advocate." In 1998, he received the University of Maryland 
School of Law's Outstanding Teacher of the Year award. 
*** J.D. candidate 2011, Georgetown University Law Center. John Grimm is a graduate 
of the University of Maryland, College Park, where he received his B.A., cum laude, in 
French in 2006 and his M.A. in Second Language Acquisition and Application in 2008. He is 
a member of the Georgetown Law moot court team, and serves on the American Criminal 
Law Review, as Editor-in-Chief of the twenty-sixth Annual Survey of White Collar Crime. 
I U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
2 Compare id. (requiring opportunity to confront witnesses), with FED. R. EVID. 803 
(admitting hearsay regardless of declarant's availability), Md. Rule 5-803 (same), FED. R. 
EVID. 804 (admitting hearsay if declarant is unavailable), and Md. Rule 5-804 (same). 
3 See FED. R. EVID. 804; Md. Rule 5-804. 
4 See FED. R. EVID. 803(5) (past recollection recorded). The "requirement" of an 
available declarant is mechanical, not substantive, arising out of the fact that the rule only 
applies when a witness who is already testifying "now has insufficient recollection." Id. 
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declarant to testify. 5 In a criminal trial, therefore, it is easy to encounter a 
situation in which a defendant cannot confront an unavailable declarant 
whose statement nevertheless meets a hearsay exception. 
From the current Supreme Court and Maryland appellate court cases 
concerning the Confrontation Clause, a series of principles can be divined 
to assist the busy trial judge or practitioner in quickly and accurately 
analyzing Confrontation Clause issues that may arise, even in the heat of 
a trial, where calm deliberation is not possible. We summarize them 
below in outline form, and then we explain how the Supreme Court and 
Maryland appellate courts have applied them to certain hearsay 
exceptions. Finally, we dare to suggest how the principles likely will be 
applied in the future to various, commonly-encountered hearsay 
exceptions that the courts have not yet addressed. 
II. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE OVERVIEW 
A. Crawford v. Washington: A New Touchstone of Admissibility 
In 2004, the Supreme Court fundamentally altered its Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence in Crawford v. Washington.6 Prior to Crawford, the 
controlling case was Ohio v. Roberts.7 Under Roberts, a court could 
allow the admission of an unavailable declarant's statement as long as it 
bore sufficient "indicia of reliability,,,8 either by meeting an established 
hearsay exception or possessing other particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.9 Crawford involved a tape-recorded statement to police 
in which the defendant's wife described the defendant stabbing the victim 
with a knife. 10 The wife was unable to testify against her husband at trial 
because of the state's spousal privilege, and, as a result, the State sought 
to introduce her recorded statement, which was not barred by the 
privilege. I I The trial judge, and ultimately the Washington Supreme 
Court, found that, under Roberts, the statement bore the necessary indicia 
of reliability, and allowed its admission. 12 
5 See Md. Rule 5-802.1, which allows the admission of certain out-of-court statements 
as long as the declarant testifies at trial. Substantively, this rule has a federal analogue, which 
also requires that the declarant testify. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(l) (applying to statements 
when "[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statement"). However, under the Federal Rules these statements are defined as 
non-hearsay, as opposed to exceptions. Compare FED. R. EVID. 801(d) with Md. Rule 5-
802.1. 
6 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
7 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, superceded by statute as 
stated in Snowden v. State, 156 Md. App. 139,846 A.2d 36 (2004). 
8 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,89 (1970). 
9 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
10 541 U.S. at 38. 
11 Id. at 40. 
12 Id. at 40-41. 
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The Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision and held that the 
Roberts test did not satisfy the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation 
Clause. 13 Under the new approach laid out in Crawford, merely meeting 
a hearsay exception is not enough to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.14 
The Sixth Amendment, the Court held, guarantees the defendant the right 
to confront anyone who bears testimony15 against him, including a 
hearsay declarant. 16 If a witness was absent at trial, the only way his or 
her out-of-court testimonial statement could be admitted is if he or she 
was unavailable1? and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine her. 18 
Because a witness, for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, is one who 
"bears testimony,,,19 Crawford shifted the touchstone of admissibility 
from a statement's reliability to its testimonial nature. 20 Thus, the key to 
understanding Crawford's scope is understanding which statements are 
testimonial. Testimony, according to Crawford, is a "solemn declaration 
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact.,,21 Statements taken by police officers during an interrogation22 are 
the clearest example of testimonial statements. 23 Beyond this, however, 
the Court obliquely left "for another day any effort to spell out a 
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial,' ,,24 which it did not do until 
2006, when it decided Davis v. Washington. 25 
B. Defining "Testimonial" Statements 
The Supreme Court first elaborated its definition of "testimonial" in 
Davis v. Washington. 26 Davis turned on whether a recorded 911 call was 
13 Id. at 60 (rejecting Roberts test). 
14 See id. at 51 ("Leaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence 
would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant 
inquisitorial practices."). 
15 Id. (defining "witnesses" as "those who 'bear testimony' ") (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, 
AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 114a (1828)). 
16 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,51 (2004). 
17 The Court does not define "unavailable," but the rules of evidence provide detailed 
definitions of when the declarant of a statement is unavailable. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a); Md. 
Rule 5-804(a). 
18 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54. 
19 See supra note 15. 
20 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
21 Id. at 51 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, supra note 15, at 91c). 
22 The Court uses this term in the colloquial, not the technical legal sense. Id. at 53 n.4. 
However, not every conversation with police is an interrogation. See Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006) ("[W]e had immediately in mind [in CrawfordJ ... interrogations 
solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime .... "). 
23 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. 
24 Id. at 68. 
25 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
26 Id. 
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testimonial. 27 During a murder trial, the State sought to introduce a 911 
recording in which the victim identified the defendant as her attacker. 28 
The 911 call presented a close question: Because it involved questioning 
by law enforcement, it could conceivably be considered an interrogation. 
However, it was made during an ongoing emergency, not an 
investigation?9 The Court held that a statement made to the police is 
nontestimonial if the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary 
purpose of the "interrogation" is to enable the police "to meet an ongoing 
emergency.,,30 A statement is testimonial if (1) the circumstances 
objectively indicate there is no ongoing emergency, and (2) the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove events relevant to 
later criminal prosecution.3) Because a 911 call, or at least the initial 
portion of a 911 call, is not ordinarily designed to establish or prove a 
past fact, but rather, to describe current circumstances, the call (or part of 
the call) will normally not be testimonial. 32 
Davis developed Crawford's inchoate definition of "testimonial," but 
it muddied the waters in terms of when Crawford applies. Although 
judges need no longer make subjective determinations of trustworthiness, 
Davis now requires them to determine what the circumstances objectively 
indicate the purpose of a police interaction to be. 33 The Davis test 
clarified the definition of "testimonial" only to the extent the specific 
facts of Davis required.34 It also intended to clarify which police 
interrogations are testimonial.35 Thus, although it is the Court's clearest 
pronouncement to date on what is "testimonial," Davis is not entirely 
clear about whether "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact,,36 follows the objective 
"primary purpose" test if it is not made to a police officer. 
There is support, however, for the idea of a general "primary purpose" 
test that determines if a statement is testimonial. In Crawford, the Court 
listed a series of possible definitions of "testimonial," which included 
"statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be 
27 ld.at817. 
28 Id. at 817-18. 
29 See id. at 823 (discussing difficulty of classifying 911 call as interrogation). 
30 Id. at 822. 
31 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813,822 (2006). 
32 Id. at 827. 
33 See id. at 834 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for introducing a test as 
unpredictable as the Roberts test). 
34 See id. at 822 (holding defmition of "testimonial" "suffices to decide the present 
cases"). 
35 See id. (distinguishing between testimonial and nontestimonial statements "when made 
in the course of police interrogation"). 
36 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER,supra note 15, at 91c). 
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available for use at a later trial.,,37 The Court has referred back to this 
particular formulation in later cases.38 Thus, while the Court has not 
articulated a comprehensive test for whether a statement is testimonial, a 
common attribute to all testimonial statements is the objective likelihood 
that they be used in trial. 
C. Exceptions to the Confrontation Requirement 
Although Crawford extended Sixth Amendment protections to even 
reliable statements of unavailable declarants, the Court did recognize that 
some limits to the Confrontation Clause exist. Crawford's holding turned 
predominately on a historical analysis of the purpose of the Sixth 
Amendment.39 Any exception to the confrontation requirement that 
existed when the Sixth Amendment was drafted would allow such 
statements to be admitted under Crawford as well. The only possible 
confrontation exception is dying declarations,40 but the Court stopped 
short of deciding the issue, and noted that, if dying declarations are an 
exception, they are sui generis.41 
The Court has recognized one additional exception on equitable, rather 
than historical grounds, which is forfeiture by wrongdoing.42 The rule of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing admits statements when the defendant's 
wrongdoing procured the declarant's unavailability, for the purpose of 
preventing the declarant from testifying. 43 The Supreme Court, in Giles 
v. Caiijornia,44 clarified that the forfeiture exception to the Confrontation 
Clause is a narrow one. In Giles, the State introduced a murder victim's 
testimonial statements at trial.45 The California Supreme Court held that 
the statements satisfied the forfeiture by wrongdoing rule embraced by 
Crawford because the defendant's intentional criminal act made the 
37 Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as 
Amici Curiae 3). 
38 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009) (finding forensic 
reports testimonial when an objective witness "would ... reasonably . . . believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial") (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52). 
39 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54-57 (discussing history of the Sixth Amendment). 
40 Id. at 56 n.6 ("The one deviation we have found involves dying declarations .... 
Although many dying declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for admitting 
even those that clearly are.") (internal citations omitted); see generally FED. R. EVID. 
804(b)(2) (modem federal dying declaration exception); Md. Rule 5-804(b)(2) (modem 
Maryland dying declaration exception). 
41 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6. "Sui generis" is defined as "[o]f its own kind or class; 
unique or peculiar." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009). 
42 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 ("[F]orfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) 
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds .... "). 
43 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6); Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5). 
44 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008). 
45 Jd. at 2682. 
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victim unavailable.46 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, noting 
that the forfeiture rule only applies when the defendant engaged III 
criminal conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying.47 
D. Confronting Forensic Reports and Affidavits 
An altogether different category of testimonial hearsay is found in 
reports written by forensic analysts. The Court first addressed the 
Confrontation Clause implications of these reports in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts.48 In Melendez-Diaz, the State sought to prove that a 
seized substance was cocaine by introducing three "certificates of 
analysis," without calling the analysts who prepared the certificates as 
witnesses.49 The Court found that the certificates easily fell into the "core 
class of 'testimonial' statements,,50 covered by Crawford. 51 Whether 
referred to as "certificates," "affidavits," or something else, the 
documents were clearly "solemn declaration[ s] or affirmation[ s] made for 
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.,,52 Thus, if the 
government wishes to introduce a lab report against a criminal defendant, 
it may not do so unless the analyst who prepared the report testifies (or 
the analyst is unavailable but was previously cross-examined).53 And, 
while the analyst who prepared the report must be called, the Court 
specifically rejected the notion that the prosecution must call everyone 
whose testimony is relevant to establish the chain of custody, the 
authenticity of the sample, or the accuracy of the testing device used to 
perform the analysis. 54 
Melendez-Diaz did not explicitly resolve whether the Confrontation 
Clause requires the government to make an affiant available for the 
defendant to cross-examine, or whether the government must 
affirmatively call the witness in its case-in-chief. However, the Supreme 
Court apparently answered this question when it decided Briscoe v. 
Virginia55 in 2010. Briscoe involved a Virginia statute, which provided 
that, when the prosecution introduces a forensic report, the 
Commonwealth must produce the analyst if the defendant wishes, and the 
defendant can examine him as a hostile witness. 56 This allowed the 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 2683, 2693. 
48 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
49 Id. at 2531. 
50 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
51 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532. 
52 Id. (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51); see also supra note 21. 
53 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532. 
54 Id. at 2532 n.l. 
55 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (per curiam). 
56 See Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 113 (Va. 2008), cert. granted sub nom., 
Briscoe v. Virginia, 129 S. Ct. 2858 (2009), vacated and remanded by 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010); 
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government to introduce forensic reports against a defendant without 
calling the affiant, and it required the defendant to call the witness in her 
case-in-chief if she wished to confront him. Virginia argued that the 
Confrontation Clause is satisfied as long as the witness is subject to in-
person cross-examination, and that the Sixth Amendment does not require 
that the prosecution call the analyst in its case-in-chief.57 This position, 
however, is at odds with dictum in Melendez-Diaz to the effect that the 
defendant's ability to call a witness is "no substitute,,58 for confrontation: 
Converting the prosecution's duty under the Confrontation Clause 
into the defendant's privilege under state law or the Compulsory 
Process Clause shifts the consequences of adverse-witness no-
shows from the State to the accused. More fundamentally, the 
Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to 
present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse 
witnesses into court. Its value to the defendant is not replaced by 
a system in which the prosecution presents its evidence via ex 
parte affidavits and waits for the defendant to subpoena the 
affiants ifhe chooses. 59 
The Briscoe Court seems to have considered this language dispositive 
because, in an unsigned order, it vacated and remanded the case to the 
Virginia Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
Melendez-Diaz.6o 
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1 (Supp. 2008) ("The accused in any hearing or trial in which a 
certificate of analysis is offered into evidence . . . shall have the right to call the person 
performing such analysis or examination or involved in the chain of custody as a witness 
therein, and examine him in the same manner as if he had been called as an adverse witness. 
Such witness shall be summoned and appear at the cost of the Commonwealth."). 
57 See Brief for Respondent at 30-39, Magruder, 275 Va. 283, 657 S.E.2d 113 (No. 
070817). Even before Briscoe, it appears that, in Maryland, the mere ability to cross-examine 
a declarant at some point was not enough to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Cf Myer v. 
State, 403 Md. 463, 943 A.2d 615 (2008). In Myer, a child sexual abuse case, the State called 
the victim as its first witness. Id. at 468, 943 A.2d at 617. At the end of its case-in-chief, it 
introduced into evidence a video of the victim's earlier interview with a social worker. Jd. at 
469,943 A.2d at 618. Although the declarant of the statement had been present and subject to 
cross-examination, the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant an 
opportunity to re-examine the victim about the videotaped interview. Jd. at 475, 943 A.2d at 
622. However, the Court of Appeals was at pains to stress that it was resolving the issue on 
Maryland evidentiary, not constitutional grounds; so, while it is informative as to the general 
attitude of Maryland courts it does not reflect any actual Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 
Seeid. 
58 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540. 
59 Jd. (emphasis added). 
60 Briscoe, 130 S. Ct. 1316. 
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E. The Confrontation Right in Maryland 
Maryland's first application of Crawford came in State v. Snowden.61 
Snowden is unique in that it involved a Maryland evidentiary rule that 
does not have a federal equivalent. Maryland's "tender years" statute62 
allows the court to admit hearsay statements of unavailable juvenile 
victims of child abuse if the statements were made to certain health or 
social work professionals. In Snowden, the State called a police sexual 
abuse investigator to testify to statements made to her by the defendant's 
alleged sexual abuse victim.63 The Court of Appeals determined that, 
under Crawford, the proper test for determining if a statement is 
testimonial is whether the statement was made under circumstances that 
would lead an objective declarant to reasonably believe the statement 
would be used at a later tria1.64 Under this test, an ordinary declarant 
would anticipate that the statements to a sexual abuse investigator would 
be used to prosecute the defendant, and the admission of those statements 
did not comport with Crawford.65 
Snowden did not eliminate the "tender years" statute, however, 
anticipating that some statements to health or social workers would be 
nontestimonia1.66 State v. Lawson67 involved such a nontestimonial 
statement. In Lawson, a sexual abuse victim made a statement to a social 
worker, not to the police.68 The court did not find the statement to be 
testimonia1.69 Emphasizing the distinction between police and social 
workers, the court noted that "[t]he mere fact that the interview was 
conducted after the police investigation and that the social worker was 
gathering information that . . . could also be used as evidence in court is 
not determinative regarding the testimonial nature of the encounter.,,70 
This is not to say that the statement was nontestimonial, however, and the 
court did not decide the issue. The Lawson court determined that 
Crawford was satisfied because the declarant herself also testified, so the 
testimonial nature of her statement to the social worker was not 
determinative of the confrontation issue.71 However, a year later, in 
61 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314 (2005). 
62 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304 (2008). 
63 385 Md. at 69,867 A.2d at 316. 
64 Jd. at 83, 867 A.2d at 325. 
65 Id. at 84, 867 A.2d at 325. 
66 Jd. at 92, 867 A.2d at 330. 
67 389 Md. 570, 886 A.2d 876 (2005). 
68 Id. at 577, 886 A.2d at 880. 
69 Id. at 589, 886 A.2d at 887 ("[E]ven if the out-of-court statements were testimonial in 
nature (and we do not so hold), they were admissible because the declarant testified at trial.") 
(emphasis added). 
70 !d. at 588 n.9, 886 A.2d at 886 n.9. 
71 Id. at 588-89, 886 A.2d at 886-87. 
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Griner v. State,72 the Court of Special Appeals addressed the testimonial 
nature of a "tender years" statement, affirmatively ruling that a statement 
made to a nurse was not testimonial because it was made in the course of 
receiving medical treatment. 
Snowden is important to Maryland courts for two reasons. It 
determined how Crawford applies to a unique Maryland statute, the 
"tender years" statute, and it adopted a definition of "testimonial" that the 
Supreme Court has not explicitly required. The Court of Special Appeals 
further developed this definition of "testimonial" in Marquardt v. State. 73 
Marquardt involved a defendant charged with assault against his wife, 
who invoked her spousal privilege and did not testify at trial. 74 The State 
introduced several statements made by the wife prior to trial. The first 
statement, made to a police officer at the hospital following the assault, 
was held to be testimonial because "a reasonable person would realize 
that their statements to the police incriminating [the declarant] would be 
'available for use at a later trial.' ,,75 The second statement admitted 
against the defendant was a recorded 911 call. 76 During the assault, the 
defendant's wife called 911 and left the phone on, so she could yell out 
her location to the dispatcher. 77 The defendant could be heard yelling at 
his wife in the recording. 78 Unlike the hospital statement, the 911 
recording was held to be nontestimonial because the primary purpose was 
to help the victim escape, not to create evidence for use at trial. 79 
Although Marquardt predates Davis, it deals with 911 recordings along 
essentially the same lines as Davis' "continuing emergency" test. 
Post-Davis, the Court of Special Appeals applied the primary purpose 
test in Head v. State. so In Head, a police officer arrived at a house after 
several people were shot.S! The officer found one of the shooting victims 
on the ground and, after asking the victim who had shot him, the victim 
identified the defendant. 82 This statement was held to be nontestimonial 
because, under Davis' subjective test, a reasonable police officer would 
72 168 Md. App. 714, 742-43,899 A.2d 189,205-06 (2006). 
73 164 Md. App. 95, 882 A.2d 900 (2005). 
74 [d. at 109, 117,882 A.2d at 908, 913. 
75 [d. at 128,882 A.2d at 919 (quoting State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 83, 867 A.2d 314, 
325 (2005»; see also Clark v. State, 188 Md. App. 110, 125, 981 A.2d 666, 675 (2009) 
(holding 911 call nontestimonial because "[t]he primary concern of a person in [the 
declarant's] situation was to get help, not to create evidence for use in a future prosecution 
against [the declarant]"). 
76 Marquardt, 164 Md. App. at 117,882 A.2d at 913. 
77 [d. at 114, 882 A.2d at 911. 
78 [d. at 116,882 A.2d at 912. 
79 [d. at 122,882 A.2d at 916. 
80 171 Md. App. 642, 912 A.2d I (2006). 
81 Jd. at 644, 912 A.2d at 2. 
82 Jd. 
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understand the statement was made during an ongoing emergency and 
would need to know who the shooter was for safety reasons.83 The Court 
of Special Appeals also mentioned that the trial court found the statement 
to be a dying declaration,84 but, because it resolved the case under the 
Davis testimonial test, it did not decide whether a dying declaration is an 
exception to Crawford. 
One final dimension to Maryland's Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence that seems at odds with both the Supreme Court and other 
Maryland decisions is the treatment of forensic statements. In 2006, the 
Court of Appeals decided Rollins v. State,85 which predates Melendez-
Diaz. In Rollins, the State introduced an autopsy report but, did not call 
the Assistant Medical Examiner who prepared the report. 86 As required 
by Crawford, the court considered whether the report was testimonial, 
and it determined that the report was a nontestimonial business record. 87 
The court noted dictum in Crawford suggesting that business records are 
not testimonial88 but ultimately found that the content of a business record 
will determine whether it is testimonia1.89 The court held that, "[i]f the 
autopsy report contains only findings about the physical condition of the 
decedent that may be fairly characterized as routine, descriptive and not 
analytical, and those findings are generally reliable ... , the report may 
be admitted into evidence.,,9o But this holding appears inconsistent with 
Davis and Snowden's emphasis on the objective purpose to which the 
statement will be put. Whether reliable or not, an autopsy report is 
almost always "made under circumstances that would lead an objective 
declarant reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for 
use at a later trial.,,91 Melendez-Diaz appears to settle the discrepancy left 
by Rollins;92 however, as of early 2010, a Maryland court has yet to 
interpret Melendez-Diaz, and the Supreme Court has yet to examine the 
rule announced by Rollins. 
83 Id. at 659, 912 A.2d at 11. 
84 Id. at 648, 912 A.2d at 4. 
85 392 Md. 455, 897 A.2d 821 (2006). 
86 Id. at 465,897 A.2d at 827. 
87 Id. at 482,510,897 A.2d at 837, 853. 
88 Id. at 473,897 A.2d at 831. See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 55 (2004) 
("Most of the [historical] hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not 
testimonial-for example, business records .... "). 
89 Rollins, 392 Md. at 497, 897 A.2d at 845-46. 
90 Id. 
91 State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 83, 867 A.2d 314,325 (2005). 
92 Like the affidavits in Melendez-Diaz, the purpose of the report in Rollins was "to 
provide 'prima facie evidence' " of the victim's cause of death. Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009). 
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F. Synthesizing the Law on Confrontation 
The contours of the confrontation right under Crawford are being 
detennined in a piecemeal fashion, but when the cases are taken 
collectively, a pattern emerges. The Supreme Court and Maryland's 
Crawford decisions can be synthesized into a series of rules guiding when 
out-of-court statements may be admitted against a criminal93 defendant: 
(1) A testimonial statement, defined as 
a. A solemn declaration or affinnation made for the purpose 
of establishing or proving some fact;94 
b. A statement made under circumstances which would lead 
an objective witness reasonably to believe the statement 
would be available for use at a later trial;95 
c. A statement made under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the questioning is 
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
later prosecution, not to enable police assistance in an 
ongoing emergency; 96 and 
d. Affidavits and forensic reports "sworn to by the declarant 
before an officer authorized to administer oaths,,;97 
(2) is inadmissible, unless 
a. The declarant 
or 
1. Testifies and is subject to cross-examination; or 
11. The declarant is unavailable98 and was previously 
available for cross-examination;99 
b. The statement meets a Confrontation Clause Exception 
1. Forfeiture by wrongdoing: The defendant procured 
the declarant's unavailability in order to prevent 
testimony;lOO 
93 The Confrontation Clause is inapplicable in civil cases. Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36,42 (2004). 
94 Id.at51. 
95 Id. at 52; Snowden, 385 Md. at 83, 867 A.2d at 325; Marquardt v. State, 164 Md. App. 
95, 121,882 A.2d 900, 915 (2005). 
96 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); Head v. State, 171 Md. App. 642, 
660,912 A.2d 1, 11 (2006). 
97 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009). 
98 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (defining 
"unavailable"); Md. Rule 5-804(a) (same). 
99 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
100 Id. at 56; Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) 
(forfeiture by wrongdoing exception); Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5) (same). 
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ii. Possibly a dying declaration;101 or 
iii. The defendant has waived his or her Confrontation 
Clause rights by (1) failing to object to the 
introduction of the testimonial statement when 
offered,102 or (2) failing to adhere to notice 
requirements designed to alert the prosecution that the 
defendant intends to invoke his or her Confrontation 
Clause rights with respect to testimonial statements, 
which otherwise would be admissible under the rules 
of evidence. 103 
This overview seeks to explain the sometimes-factious Crawford line. 
However, a broad synopsis of the theoretical landscape will not resolve 
specific Confrontation Clause issues as they arise. The following two 
parts of this article are devoted to analyzing specific principles to aid 
judges and practitioners when confrontation issues arise under the Federal 
and Maryland Rules of Evidence. 
III. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS: 
UNAV AlLABILITY OF DECLARANT NOT REQUIRED 
As outlined above, the Crawford and Snowden lines of cases may be 
synthesized into a series of principles that can help a busy trial judge or 
practitioner in analyzing Confrontation Clause issues as they arise. This 
part of the article takes that synthesis a step further and applies these 
principles to the hearsay exceptions where the unavailability of the 
declarant is not required. We do this first by explaining how the Supreme 
Court and Maryland appellate courts have applied these principles to 
specific hearsay exceptions and, then, by suggesting how these principles 
. will be applied to commonly encountered hearsay exceptions that the 
courts have yet to examine through the lens of the Confrontation Clause. 
The Maryland Rules of Evidence dealing with hearsay are generally 
patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE"), with certain 
important differences. Maryland Rule 5-801(a)-(c) contains the familiar 
hearsay formula: a statement made by a declarant at a time other than 
when testifying under oath and in the presence of the factfinder, offered 
for its substantive truth. The Maryland Rules part company with the 
101 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6 (discussing dying declaration as possible 
confrontation exception); Head v. State, 171 Md. App. 642,912 A.2d 1 (2006) (same); FED. 
R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (dying declaration exception); Md. Rule 5-804(b)(2) (same). 
102 Melendez Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2534 n.3. 
103 Id. at 2541 ("The defendant always has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause 
objection; notice-and-demand statutes simply govern the time within which he must do so. 
States are free to adopt procedural rules governing objections." (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 
433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977)). 
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Federal Rules by rejecting the notion that the collection of "[p]rior 
statement[s] by witness[es]" found in FRE 801(d)(1)104 and 
"[a]dmission[s] by party-opponent[s]," discussed in FRE 801(d)(2)(A)-
(E), are non-hearsay, as the introductory clause to FRE 801(d) asserts. 105 
Rather, the Maryland Rules treat FRE 801(d)(I) "prior witness 
statements" and FRE 801(d)(2) "admissions by party-opponents" as 
admissible hearsay. 106 
The hearsay exceptions recognized by the Maryland Rules fall into 
five categories: (I) the 5-802.1 "prior statements by witnesses" 
exceptions; (2) the 5-803(a) "statement[s] by party-opponent[s]" 
exceptions; (3) the 5-803(b) exceptions where the unavailability of the 
declarant is not required; (4) the 5-804 exceptions which require the 
unavailability of the declarant; and (5) the 5-803(b )(24) "residual" or 
"catchall" hearsay exception. In total, there are forty recognized 
exceptions, and the federal and Maryland courts have considered only a 
handful of those in the specific context of the Confrontation Clause. 
Despite the large number of exceptions, there are a much smaller number 
of hearsay exceptions that are used with great regularity in criminal trials, 
and courts have discussed a number of those using post-Crawford 
Confrontation Clause analysis. Moreover, with regard to those 
exceptions that can be expected to be involved in criminal cases and that 
have not yet been analyzed under current Confrontation Clause law, they 
are sufficiently similar to other exceptions that have been analyzed, 
permitting accurate predictions about how courts will treat them in the 
future. In the remainder of this article, we will discuss these exceptions 
and offer practical guidance to judges and lawyers regarding how the 
hearsay rules ought to be applied in future criminal cases consistently 
with the mandates of the Confrontation Clause. 
104 Those statements are: prior consistent statements made under oath at a trial, hearing, 
court proceeding, or deposition, FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(l)(A); prior consistent statements 
offered to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication, FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(I)(B); and statements 
of identification of a person made after having perceived the person, FED. R. EVID. 
801(d)(l)(C). 
105 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d) ("Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not 
hearsay if .... ") (emphasis added). 
106 Maryland Rule 5-802.1 includes the same prior witness statements found in FRE 
801(d)(l), but it adds others that are absent from the federal rule (e.g., Md. Rule 5-802. 1 (a)(2) 
(prior witness statements that have been reduced to writing and signed by the declarant); Md. 
Rule 5-802.1(a)(3) (prior witness statements that have been recorded in substantially verbatim 
fashion by stenographic or electronic means contemporaneously with the making of the 
statement); Md. Rule 5-802.l(d) (statements of prompt complaint of sexually assaultive 
behavior to which the declarant was subjected if consistent with the declarant's testimony); 
and Md. Rule 5-802. 1 (e) (statements constituting past recollection recorded». Maryland Rule 
5-803(a) contains the identical admissions by a party-opponent found at FRE 80l(d)(2)(A)-
(E). 
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A. Rule 5-802.1 Hearsay Exceptions and the Confrontation Clause 
As noted in the preceding section of this article, Maryland Rule 5-
802.1 captures the three types of statements classified as non-hearsay by 
FRE 801(d)(l), augments them with some additional statements not 
found in the Federal Rules, and characterizes them as hearsay, but 
admissible as an exception to the general prohibition against admission of 
hearsay evidence. 107 Maryland Rule 5-802.1(a) identifies three such 
statements that are admissible as substantive evidence provided the 
declarant is available to testify at trial: (1) a statement inconsistent with 
the declarant's trial testimony, provided it was given under oath under 
penalty of perjury at "a trial,. hearing, or other proceeding or in a 
deposition"; (2) a statement inconsistent with the declarant's trial 
testimony that was "reduced to writing and ... signed by the declarant"; 
and (3) a statement inconsistent with the declarant's trial testimony that 
was "recorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic or 
electronic means contemporaneously with the making of the statement." 
The latter two statements were included as a result of the Court of 
Appeals' 1993 decision in Nance v. State. \08 Additionally, Rule 5-
802.I(d) permits the introduction as substantive evidence of "prompt 
complaint[ s] of sexually assaultive behavior" that are consistent with the 
victim's trial testimony, and Rule 5 -802.1 (c) permits the introduction as 
substantive evidence of "[a] statement that is one of identification of a 
person made after perceiving the person." 
Prior testimony, written and signed statements, contemporaneously 
verbatim recorded statements, statements of prompt complaint in sexual 
assault cases, and statements made identifying a person after having 
perceived him or her are particularly well suited to finding their way into 
criminal cases. Therefore, judges and counsel can expect to be presented 
with the issue of whether these statements are substantively admissible 
107 6A LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND PRACTICE: MARYLAND EVIDENCE, STATE AND FEDERAL 
§ 802.1 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE]' 
ld. 
The Maryland Rules move the three categories of out-of-court statements listed in 
Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(l) to a new rule, Md. Rule 5-802.1, "Hearsay Statements-Prior 
Statements by Witnesses." These three categories require that the declarant testify at 
the trial or hearing and be subject to cross-examination concerning the statement. 
Because the hearsay exception for "past recollection recorded," which is codified in 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(5), also contains the requirement that the declarant testify at trial, 
Maryland placed that hearsay exception in Md. Rule 5-802.1. 
Md. Rule 5-802.1 includes the category of prompt complaints of rape and other 
sexual assault, because that exception likewise requires that the declarant testify at 
trial and be subject to cross-examination regarding the out-of-court statement. 
108 331 Md. 549,629 A.2d 633 (1993). 
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against the defendant under the Confrontation Clause. Happily, the 
answer to this question is an unequivocal "YES." The reason is quite 
simple. By definition, each of the statements identified in Rule 5 -802.1 is 
admissible only if the declarant "testifies at the trial ... and ... is subject 
to cross-examination concerning the statement.,,109 And, as the Supreme 
Court unambiguously stated in Crawford: "Finally, we reiterate that, 
when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the 
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior 
testimonial statements." I 10 
B. Rule 5-803(a) Statements by Party-Opponent and the 
Confrontation Clause 
Maryland Rule 5-803(a) identifies five categories of statements that 
are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule and that constitute 
admissions by a "party-opponent," which includes the defendant in a 
criminal case. The most frequently encountered type of admission is 
found at Rule 5-803(a)(1): The defendant's "own statement, in either an 
individual or representative capacity." Since the defendant will be 
present at trial-unless he or she is absent because of misconduct, in 
which case the right of confrontation has been forfeited III_there can be 
no Confrontation Clause impediment to introducing the defendant's own 
prior statements against him or her at triaL 112 And, from a logical 
perspective, statements by others "of which the party has manifested an 
adoption or belief in its truth," Rule 5-803(a)(2), so-called "adoptive 
admissions" also should be admissible without Confrontation Clause 
concerns, because it is the defendant's own statement or conduct that 
adopts the statement of another as his or her own. 
Similarly, Rule 5-803(a)(5) identifies "[a] statement by a 
coconspirator of the party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy" as a statement of a party-opponent that is admissible as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. Once again, by its very nature, a 
coconspirator's statement will present no Confrontation Clause issue 
109 Md. Rule 5-802.1. 
110 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2006); McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, 
supra note 107, § 801:lc.ii.B (Supp. 2009) ("By definition then, the hearsay exceptions 
codified in Md. Rule 5-802.1, which require that the declarant testify at trial and be subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement, cannot raise a confrontation clause issue.") 
(citations omitted). 
III McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, § 801:lc.ii.C(I)(Supp. 2009). 
112 Jd. at § 801:lc.iv.D(4)(d) (Supp. 2009) ("The admission against an accused of his or 
her own out-of-court statements (as an 'admission of a party opponent') does not violate the 
confrontation clause, as one cannot be heard to complain that one has no opportunity to 
confront or cross-examine oneself. Consistent with this common-sense principle, the 
Crawford majority cites seventeenth and eighteenth century authorities that 'a suspect's 
confession could be admitted ... against himself.' ") (citations omitted). 
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because it is not made with the objective expectation that it will be used 
in future criminal proceedings; indeed, it is made with exactly the 
opposite expectation. Thus, such statements cannot be "testimonial" for 
Confrontation Clause purposes, and they are admissible against the 
defendant under both the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause. 113 
Rule 5-803(a)(3) identifies as admissible under the hearsay rule "[a] 
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement 
concerning the subject." Once again, this hearsay exception requires 
proof that the defendant did authorize the statement to be made on his or 
her behalf, thus making it his or her own, and thus eliminating any 
Confrontation Clause issue for the reasons already explained above. 
The final example of an admission by a party-opponent identified by 
Rule 5-803(a) presents potential Confrontation Clause issues. 
Specifically, Rule 5-803(a)(4) recognizes as admissible as a hearsay 
exception "[a] statement by the party's agent or employee made during 
the agency or employment relationship concerning a matter within the 
scope of the agency or employment." This exception is different from a 
statement by a person specifically authorized by the defendant to make a 
statement on his or her behalf. Admissions under 5-803(a)(4) are 
typically attributed to the defendant, not because he or she specifically 
authorized them, but rather, as the byproduct of the agency or 
employment relationship they have with the defendant and the fact that 
the defendant has authorized them to act on his or her behalf within a 
range of authorized activities. 114 
To be sure, this hearsay exception typically is used in civil cases 
against a corporate, organizational, or government entity, but there is 
nothing that prevents its use in a criminal case against an individual 
person who has an agent or employee. No case has been found 
interpreting this exception in light of the Confrontation Clause, but it is 
not difficult to imagine instances where a statement made by a 
defendant's agent or employee while acting within the scope of his or her 
responsibilities will in fact be "testimonial," that is to say, made with the 
objective expectation that it will be used in future criminal proceedings. 
If so, then an argument may be made that it is not admissible under the 
Confrontation Clause unless the agent is unavailable and there was a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the agent or employee by the defendant. It 
113 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 ("Most of the hearsay exceptions [recognized as admissible 
at the time the Confrontation Clause was adopted as part of the Constitution] covered 
statements that by their nature were not testimonial-for example . . . statements in 
furtherance of a conspiracy."); McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, § 
801: Ic.iv.D(4)(c) (Supp. 2009). 
114 See B & K Rentals & Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 324 Md. 147, 153-54, 
596 A.2d 640, 643 (1991); see a/so McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, § 
801(4):5 (2001) (discussing the application of Maryland Rule 5-803(a)(4)). 
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is also foreseeable that courts would conclude that Rule 5-803(a)(4) 
admissions were not within the scope of Confrontation Clause protections 
because, assuming the foundational requirements of the rule are met, the 
statements are not those of the agent or employee, but rather, are those of 
the defendant. Resolution of this issue will have to await further 
development in the case law. 
C. Rule 5-B03(b) Exceptions-Overview 
The largest collection of hearsay exceptions-twenty-three in all-are 
found at Maryland Rule 5-803(b), and-with two exceptionsl15-these 
exceptions are largely the same as those found at FRE 803. The 
exceptions found at Rule 5-803(b) all have one thing in common: They 
are admissible regardless of the availability or unavailability of the 
declarant. This distinguishes them from the much smaller number of 
exceptions found at Rule 5-804, all of which are inadmissible unless the 
declarant is unavailable. At first blush, the Rule 5-803(b) exceptions 
seem like an impossibly diverse and confusing set of rules, collected with 
little unifying similarity other than the fact that they may be admitted 
regardless of the availability of the declarant. But, on closer examination, 
it is apparent that the rules fall into four categories, and when thought of 
in this fashion they are much easier to understand and use. 
Category One: The exceptions that deal with perception, state 
of mind, emotion, intent, and physical or mental condition, 
namely: Rule 5-803(b)(1) (present sense impression); Rule 5-
803(b )(2) (excited utterance); Rule 5-803(b )(3) (then existing 
mental, emotional or physical condition); and Rule 5-803(b)(4) 
(statements made for purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment); 
Category Two: The exceptions that deal with various types of 
records, documents and writings, namely: Rule 5-803(b)(5) 
(past recollection recorded);116 Rule 5-803(b)(6) (business 
records); Rule 5-803(b)(7) (the absence of an entry in a business 
record, offered to prove the non-existence of a fact); Rule 5-
803(b )(8) (public records); Rule 5-803(b )(9) (records of vital 
statistics); Rule 5-803(b)(1O) (the absence of a public record or 
115 The Maryland Rules of Evidence have no equivalent to FRE 803(22), which pertains to 
admissibility of judgments of previous convictions offered for a purpose other than 
impeachment under FRE 609. The federal equivalent of Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(24), which 
is the Maryland version of the "catchall" or "residual" hearsay exception, is not found in FRE 
803, but rather is found in its own rule, FRE 807. 
116 Past recollection recorded is also addressed by Maryland Rule 5-802.1(e). See supra 
note 110 and accompanying text. Since the declarant must testify in person in order for the 
foundation for this exception to be established, there are no Confrontation Clause issues 
associated with its use. Id. 
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entry in a public record offered to prove the non-existence of a 
fact); Rule 5-803(b )(11) (records ofreligious organizations); Rule 
5-803(b)(12) (certificates of baptism, marriage, or related 
certificates); Rule 5-803(b)(13) (family records); Rule 5-
803(b )(14) (records of documents affecting an interest in 
property); Rule 5-803(b)(15) (statements in documents affecting 
an interest in property); Rule 5-803(b)(16) (ancient documents); 
Rule 5-803(b )(17) (market reports and published compilations); 
Rule 5-803(b)(18) (learned treatises); and Rule 5-803(b)(23) 
(judgments as to personal, family, general history, or boundaries); 
Category Three: The exceptions that deal with various forms of 
reputation evidence, namely: Rule 5-803(b)(19) (reputation 
regarding personal or family history); Rule 5-803(b )(20) 
(reputation regarding general history or land boundaries); and 
Rule 5-803(b)(21) (reputation regarding a person's character, 
among associates or within the community); and 
Category Four: The "catchall" hearsay exception found at Rule 
5-803(b )(24). 
The similarity of the exceptions within each of the first three categories of 
rules suggests that Confrontation Clause analysis will, in most instances, 
be similar for each rule within each category. 
D. Category One: Exceptions Dealing with Perception, State of Mind, 
Emotion, Intent, and Physical or Mental Condition and the 
Confrontation Clause 
When analyzing Confrontation Clause issues associated with this first 
category of hearsay exceptions found in Maryland Rule 5-803(b), the key 
is to determine whether the statement meets the definition of a 
"testimonial statement" as defined by Crawford and the subsequent 
Confrontation Clause cases decided by the Supreme Court-namely, was 
the statement made under circumstances manifesting an objective 
expectation that the statement would be available for future use at a future 
trial?117 If "yes," then it will be "testimonial" in nature and inadmissible 
under the Confrontation Clause, regardless of whether it is admissible 
under the hearsay rules, unless the declarant is unavailable and the 
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, or the 
defendant has waived or forfeited his or her confrontation rights. 
The Supreme Court case that provides the most assistance in 
determining whether the exceptions falling within this first category are 
IJ7 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52; see also Me1endez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 
2529 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822-23 (2006). 
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testimonial or not is Davis v. Washington. 118 There, the Court analyzed 
statements admitted in two separate criminal trials, one (Davis v. 
Washington) involving a 911 call and the other (Hammon v. Indiana) 
involving a written affidavit given to the police in the course of 
investigating a domestic battery complaint, to determine whether the 
statements were testimonial under the Confrontation Clause. 119 The 
Court held: 
[S]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of 
police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating 
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial 
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such 
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution. 120 
It is noteworthy that, in the second case analyzed by the Supreme 
Court in Davis (the Hammon case), the Indiana trial court had admitted 
the victim's statements in the battery affidavit as present sense 
impressions and excited utterances. 121 Because the Supreme Court found 
that these statements were testimonial and thus inadmissible under the 
Confrontation Clause,122 the Court did not discuss the hearsay issues. 
But, with respect to Category One statements, Davis provides the best 
guidance on how a court should rule regarding the admissibility of these 
hearsay exceptions under the Confrontation Clause. 
Simply put, if a Category One statement is made under circumstances 
that manifest an objective expectation that it is being made for the 
purpose of establishing past events potentially relevant to future criminal 
prosecution,123 then it will be testimonial and inadmissible, regardless of 
whether it is admissible under the hearsay rules, unless the declarant is 
unavailable and there was a prior opportunity by the defendant to cross-
examine the declarant, or the defendant has waived or forfeited his or her 
right to confront the declarant. In most instances this determination 
should be an easy one to make. However, if a Category One statement is 
not made to a law enforcement officer, or medical provider providing 
treatment in connection with a criminal assault, then the statement was 
118 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
119 Id. at 817. 
120 Id. at 813-14. 
121 Id. at 819-2l. 
122 Id. at 820-21 (statements inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause because the 
complainant failed to appear to testify, despite having been subpoenaed, and the defendant had 
not been given a prior opportunity to cross-examine her). 
123 Id. at 822. 
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not made with the objective expectation that it will be used in a 
subsequent criminal prosecution, and it will thus be nontestimonial. 
Indeed, most Category One statements will not be testimonial, as they 
will either be made to friends, family, or even strangers, and not to law 
enforcement. Further, even those that are made in the presence of law 
enforcement will not be testimonial if the statements were volunteered or 
made in response to police inquiry, the focus of which was to assist the 
police in meeting and resolving an emergency. It is only when the 
emergency has passed and the purpose of the inquiry has shifted from 
responding to the emergency to eliciting facts to establish what happened 
for use in future criminal proceedings that the line between 
nontestimonial and testimonial has been crossed. 
For example, in State v. Lucas/24 the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
was asked to decide whether statements made by a "visibly upset" 
woman in response to questioning by a police officer who was 
responding to a domestic call were testimonial for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause. 125 The statements had been admitted by the circuit 
court judge as excited utterances under Rule 5-803(b )(2).126 Judge 
Adkins, writing for the Court of Appeals, noted that the court's task was 
to "determine whether the circumstances of [the officer's] interrogation 
[of the victim] objectively indicate[d] that its primary purpose was 'to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.' ,,127 This 
determination "requires more than a simple grammatical analysis" of the 
officer's questions. 128 Instead, it turns on a number of factors including: 
(1) "the timing of the statements" (whether made while the events were 
occurring, or describing past events); (2) "whether [ a] 'reasonable listener 
would recognize that [the declarant] . . . was facing an ongoing 
emergency"; (3) "the nature of what was asked and answered" (were the 
statements necessary to resolve the emergency or only to learn what had 
happened); and (4) "the interview's level of formality.,,129 After 
analyzing the above factors, the court concluded that the primary purpose 
of the officer's questioning of the victim was to establish or prove past 
facts, rendering the statements testimonial, and, accordingly, their 
admission into evidence against the defendant at trial was a violation of 
the Confrontation Clause. 130 
124 407 Md. 307,965 A.2d 75 (2009). 
125 /d. at 308, 965 A.2d at 76. 
126 Id. 
127 /d. at 323, 965 A.2d at 85 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 826-27). 
130 Lucas, 407 Md. 323-34, 965 A.2d at 85 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). In 
Marquardt v. State, 164 Md. App. 95, 882 A.2d 900 (2005), decided the year before Davis, 
the Court of Special Appeals, using analysis that is consistent with that employed by the Court 
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In contrast, in Griner v. State,131 decided approximately one month 
before the Supreme Court decided Davis, the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland considered whether statements made by a four-year-old boy 
were testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. He had made 
the statements to a nurse who examined him at a hospital after he was 
taken there at the direction of the police investigating whether his 
grandmother had assaulted him.132 The circuit court admitted the 
statements as those made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and 
treatment under Rule 5-803(b)(4), over the objection of the defendant that 
they violated his Confrontation Clause rights. 133 The Court of Special 
Appeals agreed, concluding that the statements were not made with the 
objective expectation that they would be used in a future criminal 
prosecution, but rather, had been made "as a routine preliminary 
procedure necessary prior to admitting him to the pediatrics ward," and 
that they were made to a registered nurse on that ward for the purpose of 
assessing the boy's condition and vital signs and to assist the nurse in 
administering necessary medication. 134 Accordingly, they were not 
testimonial. 135 
In summary, when analyzing the hearsay statements falling within the 
first category of statements contained in Rule 5-803(b) (those pertaining 
to perception, state of mind, emotional condition, intent, physical and 
mental condition, and those made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or 
treatment), their admissibility under the Confrontation Clause turns on a 
case-by-case, fact-specific determination of whether the statement was 
made in objective expectation that it would be available for use at future 
criminal proceedings, as opposed to some unrelated purpose, such as to 
identify the existence and nature of an emergency to enable medical or 
law enforcement personnel to respond appropriately. When the exigency 
has passed and the purpose of the statement is to memorialize the facts 
that occurred because they may be relevant to some future criminal 
proceedings, they will be testimonial. In making this determination, as 
the Lucas court stressed, the inquiry must be nuanced and multi -factored, 
". 1 . 1 l· ,,136 f h k d d d not a SImp e grammatlca ana YSIS 0 w at was as e an answere . 
of Appeals in Lucas, concluded that statements of an assault victim recorded during a 911 call 
and admitted by the trial court as excited utterances under Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(2) were 
nontestimonial because they were recorded contemporaneously with the occurrence of the 
assault and were not made in response to any questioning by the police or 911 operator. 
Marquardt, 164 Md. App. at 122,882 A.2d at 916. 
131 168 Md. App. 714, 899 A.2d 189 (2006). 
132 Id. at 720-26,899 A.2d at 192-96. 
133 Id. at 736-37,899 A.2d at 202. 
134 Id. at 742-43, 899 A.2d at 205. 
135 Id., 899 A.2d at 205-06. 
136 Lucas, 407 Md. at 323,965 A.2d at 85 (quoting State v. Ohlson, 168 P.3d 1273, 1279 
(Wash. 2007)). 
176 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 40.2 
E. Category Two: Exceptions Dealing with Records, Documents, and 
Writings and the Confrontation Clause 
As noted, the vast majority of the hearsay exceptions collected in 
Maryland Rule 5-803(b) deal with records, writings, and other 
documents. By far, the two most important and most frequently evoked 
exceptions are the business records exception, Rule 5-803(b)(6),137 and 
the public records exception, Rule 5-803(b)(8).138 It is not an 
exaggeration to say that the analysis, which governs whether business and 
public records are admissible under the Confrontation Clause, will serve 
equally well with the remainder of the records, documents, and writings 
covered by exceptions in Rule 5-803(b). 
As with all hearsay exceptions, the key to whether they are admissible 
under the Confrontation Clause is to determine whether they constitute 
testimonial statements. If made under circumstances where there is an 
objective expectation that they will be used as evidence in a future 
criminal proceeding, then the statements will be deemed to be testimonial 
and inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause, unless the declarant is 
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine 
the declarant, or the defendant has waived or forfeited his or her 
137 Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6) provides: 
Records of regularly conducted business activity. A memorandum, report, record, 
or data compilation of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses if (A) it was 
made at or near the time of the act, event, or condition, or the rendition of the 
diagnosis, (B) it was made by a person with knowledge or from information 
transmitted by a person with knowledge, (C) it was made and kept in the course of a 
regularly conducted business activity, and (D) the regular practice of that business 
was to make and keep the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation. A 
record of this kind may be excluded if the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of the preparation of the record indicate that the information in the 
record lacks trustworthiness. In this paragraph, "business" includes business, 
institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or 
not conducted for profit. 
138 Maryland Rule 5-803(b )(8) provides: 
Public Records and reports. (A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, a 
memorandum, report, record, statement, or data compilation made by a public 
agency setting forth (i) the activities of the agency; (ii) matters observed pursuant to 
a duty imposed by law, as to which matters there was a duty to report; or (iii) in civil 
actions and when offered against the State in criminal actions, factual findings 
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law. (B) A 
record offered pursuant to paragraph (A) may be excluded if the source of 
information or the method or circumstance of the preparation of the record indicate 
that the record or the information in the record lacks trustworthiness. (C) A record 
of matters observed by a law enforcement person is not admissible under this 
paragraph when offered against an accused in a criminal action. (D) This paragraph 
does not supersede specific statutory provisions regarding the admissibility of 
particular public records. 
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confrontation rights. If they are not testimonial, then there will be no 
Confrontation Clause hurdle to impede their admissibility, which will be 
governed by the hearsay rules. 
1. Business Records 
Turning first to the business records exception, the very elements 
needed to establish this hearsay exception provide the greatest clue as to 
whether or not it will be testimonial. In essence, a record is admissible as 
a business record, pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6), if: (1) it was 
made at or near the time of the events it describes; (2) it was made by 
someone with personal knowledge (or from information provided by 
someone with personal knowledge); (3) it was made and kept in the 
course of a regularly conducted business l39 activity; and (4) it was the 
regular practice of the business to make and keep the record. If these four 
elements are met, then the record is admissible, unless the source, 
methods, or circumstances of its making lack trustworthiness. 140 Thus, 
the underpinnings that permit the admissibility of a business record focus 
on both the regularity and routine nature of its creation and use, provided 
the circumstances of its making demonstrate its reliability. These 
characteristics also provide the clues for determining whether business 
records pass muster under the Confrontation Clause. 
In Crawford, the Supreme Court, in dicta, suggested that, in most 
instances, business records were "by their nature . . . not testimonial." 141 
Left unanswered, however, was the question of whether business records 
prepared by the government under circumstances where there was an 
objective expectation that the records would be introduced into evidence 
at a future criminal trial 142 would be deemed nontestimonial, as suggested 
in Crawford, despite the fact that they were prepared under circumstances 
that would, objectively viewed, suggest a likelihood of their use in future 
criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court recently provided the answer, 
139 Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6) defines "business" very broadly to include "business, 
institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not 
conducted for profit." Under this definition, then, government agencies would qualify as a 
"business," and courts frequently analyze the admissibility of a document under both the 
business and public records exceptions. See, e.g., Rollins v. State, 392 Md. 455, 497, 897 
A.2d 821, 845 (2006) (noting that "an autopsy report may be classified as both a business and 
a public record"). 
140 Md. Rule 5-803(b )(6). 
141 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2006) ("Most of the hearsay exceptions 
[recognized as admissible at the time the Sixth Amendment was adopted] covered statements 
that by their nature were not testimonial-for example, business records .... "). 
142 These business records could include autopsy reports, documents prepared showing 
the results of blood or chemical tests performed on drunk driving suspects, reports containing 
the results oflaboratory tests of crime scene evidence, or laboratory reports of tests performed 
on suspected illegal drugs. 
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however, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. 143 In that case, the 
Supreme Court considered whether certificates of analysis showing the 
result of forensic examination of suspected drugs seized from the 
defendant were admissible under the Confrontation Clause. l44 The Court 
concluded that the documents, referred to by the prosecution as 
"certificates," were actually indistinguishable from affidavits, stating that 
"[t]here is little doubt that the documents at issue in this case fall within 
the 'core class of testimonial statements [described in CrawfordJ.' ,,145 
Accordingly, the Court stated, "[t]he 'certificates' are functionally 
identical to live, in-court testimony, doing 'precisely what a witness does 
on direct examination,' ,,146 which clearly made them testimonial. The 
Court emphatically rejected the argument that the certificates were, In 
essence, business records, which typically are nontestimonial, stating: 
Respondent argues that the analysts' affidavits are admissible 
without confrontation because they are "akin to the types of 
official and business records admissible at common law." But the 
affidavits do not qualify as traditional official or business records, 
and even if they did, their authors would be subject to 
confrontation nonetheless. 
Documents kept in the regular course of a business may 
ordinarily be admitted at trial despite their hearsay status. See 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). But that is not the case if the regularly 
conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use 
at trial. Our decision in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 ... 
(1943), made that distinction clear. There we held that an 
accident report provided by an employee of a railroad company 
did not qualify as a business record because, although kept in the 
regular course of the railroad's operations, it was "calculated for 
use essentially in court, not in the business." The analysts' 
certificates-like police reports generated by law enforcement 
officials-do not qualify as business or public records for 
precisely the same reason. 147 
The Court further discussed the Confrontation Clause implications of 
business and official records, stating: 
143 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
144 ld. at 2530. 
145 ld. at 2532. 
146 ld. (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813,830 (2006)). 
147 ld. at 2538 (internal citations omitted). The Court also noted that "[t]he early 
common-law cases [that allowed admission of business records] likewise involve records 
prepared for the administration of an entity's affairs, and not for use in litigation." ld. at 2538 
n.7. 
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Respondent also misunderstands the relationship between the 
business-and-official-records hearsay exceptions and the 
Confrontation Clause. As we stated in Crawford: "Most of the 
hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were 
not testimonial-for example, business records or statements in 
furtherance of a conspiracy." Business and public records are 
generally admissible absent confrontation not because they 
qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because-
having been created for the administration of an entity's affairs 
and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at 
trial-they are not testimonial. Whether or not they qualify as 
business or official records, the analysts' statements here-
prepared specifically for use at petitioner's trial-were testimony 
against petitioner, and the analysts were subject to confrontation 
under the Sixth Amendment. 148 
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Thus, Melendez-Diaz provides the key for distinguishing when 
business and public records are testimonial for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause. Regardless of whether they may be classified as 
business or public records under the hearsay rules, they are 
nontestimonial if prepared for the administration of the entity's own 
affairs, but testimonial if prepared for the purpose of establishing or 
proving some fact at trial. In this regard, the Court seems to require more 
than just foreseeability that business or public records may be introduced 
into evidence in some future trial in order for them to cross the line 
between nontestimonial and testimonial. Rather, the focus appears to be 
on the purpose for which the record was created: If the purpose is to 
create a document "for use essentially in the court,,149 which does 
"precisely what a witness does on direct examination,,,15o then the 
business or public record will be testimonial. 
However, the mere possibility or foreseeability of use in trial of a 
business or public record that truly was prepared for the purpose of 
proper administration of the government entity's own internal affairs 
would not appear to render it testimonial, as the Court suggested in a 
footnote, when it stated that, "[a]dditionally, documents prepared in the 
regular course of equipment maintenance may well qualify as 
nontestimonial records.,,151 Further, in the body of the opinion itself, the 
Court stated that, at common law, "[a] clerk could by affidavit 
authenticate or provide a copy of an otherwise admissible record, but 
could not do what the analysts did here: create a record for the sole 
148 Id. at 2539-40 (internal citations omitted). 
149 Id. at 2538 (quoting Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943)). 
150 Id. at 2532 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 830). 
151 Id. at 2532 n.!. 
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purpose of providing evidence against a defendant.,,152 The Court thus 
provided two examples of government business-public records that may 
withstand a Confrontation Clause challenge because they are 
nontestimonial: (1) documents created for the purpose of administering 
the internal affairs of the government entity and (2) documents that serve 
to authenticate as true and accurate copies of other records, which 
themselves are nontestimonial and admissible under the Confrontation 
Clause. 
Maryland courts also have considered whether business and public 
records are testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. In 
Rollins v. State,153 decided after Crawford but before Melendez-Diaz, the 
Court of Appeals considered whether autopsy reports prepared by the 
medical examiner's office and offered into evidence in a homicide case 
were testimonial. The court ruled that the reports only would be 
testimonial if they were made under circumstances that would lead an 
objective person reasonably to believe that the report would be available 
for use at a later criminal trial. 154 It noted that autopsy reports were not 
created exclusively to be used as evidence in criminal cases but were 
required by statute to be prepared in all deaths that occurred by violence, 
suicide, or casualty; suddenly, if the deceased was in apparent good 
health or unattended by a doctor; or in a suspicious or unusual manner. 155 
The court concluded: 
When the report is offered as evidence against the defendant at 
trial, in a criminal case, we conclude that an autopsy report is not 
per se "testimonial" in light of Crawford. The trial court must 
determine whether the report contains testimonial or non-
testimonial hearsay statements. The testimonial statements may 
not be admitted against the defendant at trial, unless the declarant 
is unavailable and there was a prior opportunity for cross-
examination. 156 
It then went on to explain: 
[F]indings in an autopsy report of the physical condition of a 
decedent, which are routine, descriptive and not analytical, which 
are objectively ascertained and generally reliable and enjoy a 
generic indicum[ sic] of reliability, may be received into evidence 
without the testimony of the examiner. Where, however, 
contested conclusions or opinions in an autopsy report are central 
152 Id. at 2539 (emphasis in original). 
153 392 Md. 455, 497, 897 A.2d 821, 845-46 (2006). 
154 Id. at 484, 897 A.2d at 838. 
155 Id. at 485 & n.18, 486, 897 A.2d at 838 & n.18, 839. 
156 Id. at 486-87,897 A.2d at 839. 
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to the determination of corpus delecti or criminal agency and are 
offered into evidence, they serve the same function as testimony 
and trigger the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. 157 
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However commendable the court's effort to parse through autopsy 
reports line by line to divine the testimonial from the nontestimonial, it is 
doubtful whether its reasoning would withstand analysis after Melendez-
Diaz. As noted, the standard articulated in that case was not whether the 
content of the business or public record was "routine," "descriptive," or 
"non-analytical," or "reliable" as opposed to "contested conclusions," but 
rather, whether the purpose of making that particular record was for 
administration of the internal affairs of the "business" or government 
office, as opposed to recording for future litigation use the type of facts 
typically testified to by witnesses at trial. 158 What Rollins failed to 
acknowledge was that, while some autopsy reports may not be prepared 
with the objective expectation that they will be introduced at a future 
criminal trial (say, for example, in the case of a suicide with no indication 
of foul play), thus making them nontestimonial, it is a certainty that those 
autopsy reports, which reach the conclusion that the cause of death was 
homicide, must of necessity trigger an objective expectation that they, 
with reasonable foreseeability, may be offered into evidence at a criminal 
case, clearly making them testimonial. Melendez-Diaz does not stand for 
the proposition that courts should consider business records generically to 
determine whether or not they are testimonial, because, as Crawford 
noted,159 business records at common law are classic examples of 
nontestimonial hearsay. Rather, Melendez-Diaz requires consideration of 
the reason why a particular business or public record or report was made, 
and if, viewed objectively, it appears that it was prepared for a litigation-
related purpose, rather than for administration of the internal affairs of the 
business or government office, then it will be testimonial. 
Even more fundamentally, however, the approach taken in Rollins is 
suspect even under Crawford, which it purported to follow, because the 
Rollins court's continued use of the "reliability" of the information in an 
autopsy report as a measure of whether it complies with the Sixth 
Amendment l60 clashes with the unambiguous statement in Crawford: "To 
be sure, the [Confrontation] Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability 
157 ld. at 489,897 A.2d at 841. 
158 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009). 
159 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,56 (2006). 
160 Rollins, 392 Md. 455, 497, 897 A.2d 821, 845-46 (2006) ("If the autopsy report 
contains only findings about the physical condition of the decedent that may be fairly 
characterized as routine, descriptive and not analytical, and those findings are generally 
reliable and are afforded an indicum [sic] of reliability, the report may be admitted into 
evidence without the testimony of its preparer, and without violating the Confrontation 
Clause."). 
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of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It 
commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in 
a particular manner .... ,,161 That "procedural guarantee" is appearance 
at trial for cross-examination, or, if unavailable at trial, availability for 
cross-examination before trial begins. Rollins appears to support the 
notion that the determination of "testimonial" vel non turns on whether 
particular entries in an autopsy report are "reliable" rather than "contested 
or disputed," instead of the foreseeability, objectively viewed, that the 
record will be used in a future criminal trial. Thus, it is unlikely that the 
conclusions reached in Rollins will continue to withstand analysis 
following Melendez-Diaz. 
Similarly, in Costley v. State/ 62 decided after Rollins, but before 
Melendez-Diaz, the Court of Special Appeals, citing Rollins, held that the 
trial court did not commit error by admitting into evidence in a criminal 
trial an unredacted autopsy report because the defendant failed to 
challenge at trial the portions of the report that addressed the manner of 
death or the conclusions reached by the medical examiner. Because of its 
reliance on Rollins, the future usefulness of Costley is also uncertain. 
2. Public Records 
As already described in the preceding section, the Supreme Court and 
Maryland appellate courts have analyzed the Confrontation Clause issues 
associated with business records and public records simultaneously, 
noting that forensic and autopsy reports could qualify as both business 
and public records. 163 The reason is apparent when the two rules are 
examined together, as they are so structurally similar. For instance, under 
the Maryland Rules, business records include "[a] "memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation," 1 64 while public records include "a 
memorandum, report, record, statement or data compilation" made by a 
public agency.165 Also, a business record that meets the requirements of 
the rule may still be excluded from evidence if "the source of information 
or the method or circumstances of the preparation of the record indicate 
that the information in the record lacks trustworthiness.,,166 This is 
similar to a public record otherwise admissible under the rule, which may 
161 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
162 175 Md. App. 90, 125-26, 926 A.2d 769, 789-90 (2007). 
163 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538 ("Respondent argues that the analysts' affidavits are 
admissible without confrontation because they are 'akin to the types of official and business 
records admissible at common law.' "); Rollins, 392 Md. at 482, 897 A.2d at 836-37 
(concluding that the autopsy report was admissible as both a business and a public record); 
Costley, 175 Md. App. at 123,926 A.2d at 788 (citing Rollins, 392 Md. at 491, 897 A.2d at 
842). 
164 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6). 
165 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(A). 
166 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6). 
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be excluded "if the source of information or the method or circumstances 
of the preparation of the record indicate that the record or the information 
in the record lacks trustworthiness.,,167 Finally, Maryland Rule 5-
803(b)( 6) defines a "business" broadly to include a "business, institution, 
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or 
not conducted for profit." Thus, a federal, state, or local government 
entity would fit into this definition of a "business." 
In light of the structural similarities between the two rules and the 
willingness of the courts to analyze records prepared by government 
entities under the same analysis as business records for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause, the lessons learned in Melendez-Diaz regarding 
when business records are "testimonial," discussed in the preceding 
section, apply with equal force to public records: They are testimonial if, 
objectively viewed, it is reasonably foreseeable that they will be used in 
future criminal proceedings against a defendant. 168 The Supreme Court 
further refined the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial 
business and public records as follows: "Business and public records are 
generally admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify under 
an exception to the hearsay rules, but because-having been created for 
the administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact at trial-they are not testimonial.,,169 
The key distinction is whether the records were prepared for the internal 
administration of the government entity's affairs or to be used to prove a 
fact against a defendant in a criminal trial. 
There is one final point to be made about the Confrontation Clause 
issues associated with public records under Rule 5 -803(b )(8) that 
underscores the above conclusions. In essence, the public records 
exception applies to three general types of records: (1) those setting forth 
"the activities of the agency"; 170 (2) those setting forth "matters observed 
pursuant to a duty imposed by law, as to which matters there was a duty 
to report,,;171 and (3) those setting forth "in civil actions and when offered 
against the State in criminal actions, factual findings resulting from an 
investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law."J72 Further, 
with respect to the second category of public records, those setting forth 
matters observed pursuant to a legally imposed duty to report, Rule 5-
803(b)(8)(C) states that "[a] record of matters observed by a law 
enforcement person is not admissible under this paragraph when offered 
167 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(B). 
168 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2531. 
169 ld. at 2539-40. 
170 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(A)(i). 
171 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(A)(ii). 
172 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(A)(iii). 
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against an accused in a criminal action." 
These restrictions-stated in the rule itself-dovetail entirely with the 
Supreme Court's discussion in Melendez-Diaz regarding the distinction 
between testimonial and nontestimonial public records. Public records 
containing descriptions of matters observed where there is a legal duty to 
report173 are not admissible against a defendant in a criminal case because 
their purpose is to record evidence of criminal activity, not to efficiently 
regulate the activities of the official entity. Similarly, findings of fact 
from investigations made pursuant to authority granted by law 174 are only 
admissible in criminal cases against the State, not the defendant, for 
exactly the same reason: By definition, fact findings resulting from 
investigations authorized by law are created in anticipation of use in 
litigation, not for the internal administration of the affairs of the creating 
agency. This distinction appears to have been overlooked by the Court of 
Appeals in Rollins, and Court of Special Appeals in Costley, but it was 
not overlooked by the Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz. 175 
3. Hearsay Exceptions Regarding Other Documents, Records, 
and Writings Found in Rule 5-803(b) 
As noted in the introduction to this section, the hearsay exceptions 
found in Maryland Rule 5-803(b) address an assortment of various 
documents, records, and writings, in addition to business and public 
records, including: 5-803(b)(9) (records of vital statistics); 5-803(b)(11) 
(records of religious organizations); 5-803(b)(12) (marriage, baptismal, 
and similar certificates); 5-803(b)(13) (family records); 5-803(b)(14) 
(records of documents affecting an interest in property); 5-803(b)(15) 
(statements in documents affecting an interest in property); 5-803(b)(16) 
(statements in ancient documents); 5-803(b)(17) (market reports and 
published compilations); 5-803(b )(18) (learned treatises); and 5-
803(b)(23) Gudgment as to personal, family or general history, or 
boundaries). These hearsay exceptions are far less frequently employed 
than the business and public records exceptions, and, not surprisingly, 
research has failed to reveal any case since Crawford in which the 
Supreme Court or a Maryland court has analyzed the admissibility of 
these exceptions under the Confrontation Clause. However, since each of 
them shares similarities with business and public records, and since each 
involves a writing of some sort, there is little doubt that their 
173 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(A)(ii). 
174 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(A)(iii). 
175 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538 ("The analysts' certificates-like police reports 
generated by law enforcement officials-do not qualify as business or public records for 
precisely the same reason. See [FED. R. EVID.j 803(8) (defining public records as 'excluding, 
however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement 
personnel).") (emphasis added). 
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admissibility under the Confrontation Clause would be governed by the 
same analysis that courts have used to evaluate admissibility under the 
Confrontation Clause of business and public records. 176 
Thus, if the documents, records, or writings were prepared with the 
objective expectation that they would be used in future criminal 
proceedings against an accused or for the purposes of use in litigation, 
then they would be testimonial and inadmissible under the Confrontation 
Clause, despite qualifying as hearsay exceptions, unless the declarant was 
unavailable and there had been a prior opportunity for the defendant to 
cross-examine the declarant, or the defendant had waived or forfeited his 
or her confrontation rights. Practically speaking, however, the very 
nature of most of these exceptions makes it highly unlikely that they will 
be deemed to be testimonial. Records of religious organizations, family 
. records (such as entries made in family Bibles), certificates of baptism or 
marriage, property records, ancient documents, market compilations and 
direct~ries, and learned treatises are simply not prepared with the 
objective expectation that they will be used in criminal prosecutions 
against an accused. Indeed, by their very nature, they are prepared for the 
administration of a religious, family, government, or business purpose 
and not in anticipation of use in criminal prosecutions. 
Two additional exceptions found in Rule 5-803(b) also are unlikely to 
raise Confrontation Clause issues for the simple reason that they do not 
involve use of any out-of-court statement offered for its truth. To the 
contrary, they are offered to prove the nonexistence of a fact or 
nonoccurrence of an event. Rule 5-803(b )(7),177 which pertains to 
business records, and 5-803(b)(1O),J78 which pertains to public records, 
176 McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, §§ 803(11):1 to 803(18):1 (2001 & 
Supp. 2009). 
177 Maryland Rule 5-803(b )(7) provides: 
Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with subsection (b)(6). Unless the 
circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness, evidence that a diligent search 
disclosed that a matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data 
compilations kept in accordance with subsection (b)(6), when offered to prove the 
nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind about 
which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made and 
preserved. 
178 Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(I 0) provides: 
Absence of public record or entry. Unless the circumstances indicate a lack of 
trustworthiness, evidence in the form of testimony or a certification in accordance 
with Rule 5-902 that a diligent search has failed to disclose a record, report, 
statement, or data compilation made by a public agency, or an entry therein, when 
offered to prove the absence of such a record or entry or the nonoccurrence or 
nonexistence of a matter about which a record was regularly made and preserved by 
the public agency. 
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permit the introduction of evidence that a diligent search has failed to 
disclose the existence of a business or public record, or entry within a 
business or public record, for the purposes of proving the nonexistence of 
a record or nonoccurrence of an event that, had it occurred, would have 
been memorialized in a business or public record. These exceptions 
present no Confrontation Clause issue because there is no out-of-court 
statement being offered. 179 
F. Category Three: Hearsay Exceptions in Rule 5-B03(b) Pertaining to 
Reputation and the Confrontation Clause 
As stated in the introduction to this section, the third category of 
hearsay exceptions, found in Maryland Rule 5-803(b), involves three 
exceptions, all dealing with reputation evidence. Rule 5-803(b)(19)180 
addresses reputation concerning personal or family history; Rule 5-
803(b)(20)181 addresses reputation concerning boundaries or general 
history; and Rule 5-803(b)(21)182 addresses reputation as to character. 
Since reputation evidence necessarily involves the collective judgment of 
a group or community regarding-with respect to these particular rules-
a person's family history, a property boundary, an historical event, or a 
character trait of a person that is established over time, it seems highly 
unlikely that a reputation could develop under circumstances that would 
meet the definition of "testimonial" under Crawford. 183 Rather, it is most 
likely that the reputation evidence will be provided by a live witness at 
trial who will testify as to his or her knowledge of the particular 
reputation at issue and, in so doing, be available for cross-examination. 
Further, from a practical perspective, the type of reputation evidence 
179 McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, §§ 803(7): I, 803(10): I (Supp. 2009). 
180 Maryland Rule 5-803(b )(19) provides: 
Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation, prior to the 
controversy before the court, among members of a person's family by blood, 
adoption, or marriage, or among a person's associates, or in the community, 
concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, or other similar fact 
of personal or family history. 
181 Maryland Rule 5-803(b )(20) provides: 
Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. (A) Reputation in a 
community, prior to the controversy before the court, as to boundaries of, interests 
in, or customs affecting lands in the community. (B) Reputation as to events of 
general history important to the community, state, or nation where the 
historicalevents occurred. 
182 Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(21) provides: "Reputation as to character. Reputation of a 
person's character among associates or in the community." 
183 McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, §§ 803(19):1, 803(21):1 (Supp. 2009) 
("The out-of-court statements generating reputation evidence under [these] hearsay 
exception[s] would seem clearly to be nontestimonial under Crawford v. Washington."). 
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covered by these rules would likely be introduced in criminal cases 
infrequently. Accordingly, judges and practitioners can expect that these 
three exceptions will seldom, if ever, be objectionable under the 
Confrontation Clause. 
G. Category Four: The Rule 5-B03(b)(24) "Catchall" Exception 
and the Confrontation Clause 
The final "category" (albeit a category of one, but with infinite 
possibilities) of hearsay exceptions found in Maryland Rule 5-803(b) is 
the so-called "catchall exception" found at Rule 5-803(b )(24).184 It is the 
Maryland equivalent of FRE 807. And, although located in Rule 5-803, 
the exception covers any statement "not specifically covered by any of 
the hearsay exceptions listed in this Rule or in Rule 5-804," provided the 
following factors are met: (1) the statement is offered to prove a "material 
fact"; (2) the statement is more probative evidence of that material fact 
than any other evidence that, with reasonable effort, could be procured to 
prove it; (3) the general purpose of the evidence rules and the interests of 
justice will be served by permitting the introduction of the evidence; and 
(4) sufficient advance notice of the intent to introduce the evidence is 
given to the opposing party, as well as the particulars of the statement and 
the name and address of the declarant. 185 It is readily apparent that this 
exception, limited only by human imagination, could be abused to the 
extent of trumping the established hearsay exceptions and the very rule 
against admission of hearsay itself. However, the committee note for 
Rule 5-803(b)(24) cautions that the rule 
does not contemplate an unfettered exercise of judicial discretion, 
but it does provide for treating new and presently unanticipated 
situations which demonstrate a trustworthiness within the spirit of 
the specifically stated exceptions. . . . It is intended that the 
184 Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(24) provides: 
Other exceptions. Under exceptional circumstances, the following are not excluded 
by the hearsay rule: A statement not specifically covered by any of the hearsay 
exceptions listed in this Rule or in Rule 5-804, but having equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is 
offered as evidence of a material fact; (8) the statement is more probative on the 
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can 
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and 
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into 
evidence. A statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the 
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the trial 
or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, 
the intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and 
address of the declarant. 
185 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(24). 
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residual hearsay exception will be used very rarely, and only in 
exceptional circumstances. 186 
It is, therefore, apparent that two conclusions can be drawn about the 
Confrontation Clause issues that may be associated with efforts to 
introduce hearsay under the catchall exception: (1) if the rule is applied 
as intended by its drafters, then attempts to use it will be infrequent and 
only in exceptional circumstances, and (2) it is impossible to anticipate in 
advance every instance where use of the rule may apply. Regardless, the 
Confrontation Clause implications of this rule are rather simple. If the 
hearsay statement offered under Rule 5-803(b)(24) meets the definition of 
a "testimonial statement" as discussed above, then it will not be 
admissible against a defendant in a criminal trial unless the declarant is 
unavailable and there was a prior opportunity for cross-examination, or 
the defendant has waived or forfeited his or her confrontation rights. 187 
Practically speaking, judges and lawyers should compare the hearsay 
statement offered under the catchall exception to the closest analog 
among the existing hearsay exceptions, and then determine whether that 
particular type of hearsay has been--or is likely to be-treated as 
testimonial under the Supreme Court and Maryland cases. 
IV. HEARS A Y EXCEPTIONS: DECLARANT UNAVAILABLE 
In the preceding two parts of this article, we synthesized the principles 
developed in the Crawford and Snowden lines of cases and then applied 
them to the specific hearsay exceptions that do not require the 
unavailability of the declarant. As noted throughout the article, Crawford 
requires that testimonial statements made by a declarant be inadmissible 
unless two conditions are satisfied. First, the declarant must be 
unavailable to testify at trial. 188 Second, the defendant must have had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 189 With limited 
exception, unless both of these conditions are met, the statement will be 
excluded under the Confrontation Clause, even if it is not excluded as 
inadmissible hearsay. 190 This part of the article addresses the 
applicability of Crawford to the hearsay exceptions that require the 
declarant to be unavailable and, additionally, analyzes the limited 
exceptions to the Confrontation Clause's requirement that testimonial 
out-of-court statements are inadmissible. 
186 Md. Rule 5-803(b) advisory committee's note. 
187 McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, § 803(24):1 (Supp. 2009) 
(" 'Testimonial' statements offered against an accused [under Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(24)] 
must comply with Crawford. "). 
188 See supra Part II.F. 
189 ld. 
190 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
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A. Maryland Rule 5-804 Overview 
With one significant difference,191 the Maryland hearsay exceptions 
that require the unavailability of the declarant to testify closely resemble, 
if not are identical to, the federal rules from which much of these 
exceptions are derived. 192 Unlike Maryland Rule 5-803, which does not 
require the unavailability of the declarant as a prerequisite to 
admissibility, Maryland Rule 5-804 requires that the declarant of the 
statement not be available to testify as a witness. More specifically, it is 
the unavailability of the declarant's testimony, not the unavailability of 
the declarant, which is required by this rule. 193 
Under Maryland Rule 5-804, hearsay statements will not be excluded 
by the rule against hearsay, Maryland Rule 5-802, if the following is 
present: (1) the declarant is "unavailable as a witness," and (2) the 
statement qualifies as an exception under Maryland Rule 5-804(b). 
Regarding the first condition, Rule 5-804(a) identifies five situations that 
qualify a declarant to be "unavailable as a witness." 194 Judges and 
practitioners should note that the examples of declarant unavailability 
provided by Rule 5-804(a) are illustrative and not exclusive. 195 A 
declarant may be unavailable because: (1) the declarant is exempted by a 
claim of privilege; (2) the declarant refuses to testify; (3) the declarant 
claims lack of memory; (4) the declarant is unable to testify due to death 
or physical or mental infirmity; or (5) the declarant is absent from the 
hearing and the proponent has been unable to procure the absent 
declarant's attendance or testimony by service of process or similar 
means. l96 A statement will not qualify for an exception under section (b) 
of the rule if the unavailability of the witness is due to the procurement or 
wrongdoing of the proponent of the statement for the purpose of 
preventing the witness from attending or testifying. 197 
191 See infra Part IV.E. 
192 Compare FED. R. EVID. 804, with Md. Rule 5-804. 
193 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
804.03[1] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE] ("The declarant's presence on the witness stand will not block use of his or her 
extra-judicial statement if the declarant refuses to answer, exercises a privilege not to answer, 
or is suffering from a mental disability or impairment of memory that results in the 
'unavailability' of testimony."). 
194 Md. Rule 5-804(a). 
195 Md. Rule 5-804(a) (" 'Unavailability as a witness' includes situations in which .... ") 
(emphasis added). 
196 Md. Rule 5-804(a). See McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, §§ 804:1 to 
806(6):2 (2001 & Supp. 2009), for a discussion of the five circumstances of ''unavailability'' 
under 5-804 and comparison to the federal rules and common law. 
197 Md. Rule 5-804(a). FRE 804(a) similarly provides that a declarant is NOT unavailable 
as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability or absence due to the 
procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing the 
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If the witness is, in fact, unavailable, a judge or attorney must then 
look to the particular type of statement to determine if it falls under one 
of five exceptions. Maryland Rule 5-804(b) provides that the following 
statements may be entered in evidence and not excluded by the hearsay 
rule: (1) former testimony; (2) statement under impending belief of death; 
(3) statement against interest; (4) statement of personal or family history; 
and (5) statements made by a witness now unavailable because of a 
party's wrongdoing. Thus, if the witness is unavailable and the statement 
falls under one of these five exceptions, then the statement may be 
admitted in evidence, unless excluded for other reasons. 198 
The Court in Crawford held that the Sixth Amendment demands, as 
the common law required, unavailability of the declarant and prior 
opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine the witness. 199 The 
Confrontation Clause, therefore, does not prohibit the introduction of a 
prior testimonial statement for its substantive truth if the statement meets 
the requirements laid out in Crawford. In criminal cases, when hearsay 
statements are also "testimonial," a defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to confrontation must be considered. The following sections examine the 
exceptions provided by Maryland Rule 5-804(b) under such a context. 
B. Rule 5-804(b)(1) Former Testimony and the Confrontation Clause 
Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(1), as does FRE 804(b)(1), provides a 
specific exception to the hearsay rule concerning statements given in 
former testimony. Under this exception, former testimony will not 
violate the Confrontation Clause because the exception itself requires 
both that the declarant be unavailable to testify and that the defendant had 
the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant when the former testimony 
was given. In Williams v. State, the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland considered this precise issue, noting, "we need not make an 
independent inquiry into appellant's Sixth Amendment claim because our 
finding that the testimony was properly admitted under Rule 5-804(b)(1) 
is necessarily predicated on a determination that appellant had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine [the declarant].,,2oo Former testimony, 
unlike other exceptions, does not rely upon some set of circumstances to 
witness from attending or testifying. Nevertheless, such statements will not be excluded by 
the hearsay rule under FRE 804(b). . 
198 As for example, otherwise relevant evidence excluded by "constitutions, statutes or 
these rules, or by decisional law not inconsistent with these rules." Md. Rule 5-402. 
199 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,68 (2004). 
200 Williams v. State, 183 Md. App. 517, 533, 962 A.2d 440, 449 (2008), cert. granted, 
408 Md. 149,968 A.2d 1064 (Apr. 7, 2009); see also United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 443, 
445 (5th Cir. 2004) ("The qualities that made [the witness'] testimony admissible under 
804(b)(l) make it meet Crawford'S [Sixth Amendment] Confrontation Clause test: 
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross examination."). 
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substitute for oath and cross-examination, since both oath and opportunity 
to cross-examine were present in fact. The only ideal condition for the 
giving of testimony missing is the opportunity for the jury to observe the 
witness' demeanor while testifying. 201 
The language of both Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(l) and FRE 804(b)(1) 
is essentially identical, except with respect to the way each describes the 
forum in which the testimony is given. The Maryland rule includes 
testimony "given as a witness in any action or proceeding or in a 
deposition.,,202 The federal rule describes testimony given at "another 
hearing of the same or a different proceeding. ,,203 Both rules require that 
the party against whom the statement is being offered have had the 
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony either by direct, 
cross, or redirect examination.204 Additionally, they both mandate that the 
issue to which the testimony related at the former hearing is substantially 
identical to the issue in the present case.205 
In criminal cases, there must be an opportunity for the defendant to 
cross-examine the witness whose former testimony from a prior trial is 
now being offered against the defendant in his or her current trial. 206 
Tactical or strategic decisions will not constitute a denial of the 
opportunity to examine. Only an opportunity to develop the testimony is 
required; there need not have been an actual examination of the witness 
by the party or predecessor in interest.207 For example, a party's choice to 
201 See FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee's note. However, this condition is present 
if the former testimony was video recorded. See, e.g., United States v. McGowan, 590 F.3d 
446, 456 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that unavailable witness' videotaped deposition "allowed the 
jury to fully experience [the witness'] testimony, to view her demeanor, to hear her voice and 
to determine her credibility"). 
202 Md. Rule 5-804(b)(1). Depositions are admissible in a federal civil case under FED. R. 
CIv. P. 32(a)(3) and in a federal criminal case under FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(f). 
203 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). 
204 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); Md. Rule 5-804(b)(1); see also Williams v. State, 183 Md. 
App. 517, 531,962 A.2d 440, 448 (2008), cert. granted, 408 Md. 149, 968 A.2d 1064) (2009) 
("In determining the admissibility of the testimony of a witness from an earlier proceeding 
under Rule 5-804(b )(1), the issue is whether the party opposing the admission had a similar 
motive to cross-examine that witness at the prior proceeding, not whether he, in fact, acted on 
that motive."). 
205 See United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (excluding prior 
testimony because ofa failure to show similar motive); United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416 
(9th Cir. 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 518 U.S. 81 (1996); United 
States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Feldman, 761 F.2d 
380, 385 (7th Cir. 1985) (factors for determining "similarity of motive" include: "(1) the type 
of proceeding in which the testimony is given, (2) trial strategy, (3) the potential penalties or 
financial stakes, and (4) the number of issues and parties") (citations omitted). 
206 Tyler v. State, 342 Md. 766, 774-75, 679 A.2d 1127, 1131-32 (1996); Williams, 183 
Md. App. at 533, 962 A.2d at 449. 
207 United States v. Mann, 161 F.3d 840, 861 (5th Cir. 1998); Koon, 34 F.3d at 1427; 
Crawford v. State, 282 Md. 210, 220-22, 383 A.2d 1097,1103-04 (1978); Williams, 183 Md. 
App. at 531, 962 A.2d at 447-48. 
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limit or forego examination in a motion hearing or deposition will not 
necessarily preclude the admissibility of testimony from the hearing or 
deposition in a later tria1.208 
C. Rule 5-804(b)(2) Statements Under Belief of Impending Death and the 
Confrontation Clause 
In Crawford, the Court also left "for another day" the question of 
whether the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay 
should be applied in the dying declaration hearsay exception to the rule 
prohibiting the admission of hearsay evidence.209 Only testimonial 
statements cause the out-of-court declarant to be a "witness" within the 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause. The Court noted that most hearsay 
exceptions cover statements that are, by their nature, not testimonia1.210 
And, accordingly, most dying declarations are likely to be 
nontestimonia1.211 Moreover, the Court found authority for admitting 
even those dying declarations that were testimonial, noting that dying 
declarations were the only recognized criminal hearsay exception that 
was well established at common law.212 The Court, however, refused to 
consider whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for 
dying declarations.213 Rather, the Court found that, if dying declarations 
must be admissible under the Sixth Amendment on historical grounds, 
they would be a sui generii 14 exception.215 The Court has not yet 
resolved this issue.216 
208 See United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779, 791-93 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 
U.S. 967 (1980). 
209 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,56 n.6 (2004). 
210 Id. at 56. 
211 Id. at 56 n.6. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 See supra note 41. 
215 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6. 
216 As discussed in Weinstein's treatise on evidence: 
Some statements qualifying as dying declarations under Rule 804(b )(2) likely will 
be testimonial, while others will not. The Supreme Court in Crawford found "scant 
evidence that exceptions were invoked to admit testimonial statements against the 
accused in a criminal case." However, in the Court's view, dying declarations 
presented "the one deviation" from that situation. "Although many dying 
declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for admitting even those that 
clearly are." The Court found support for this view in light of the fact that dying 
declarations were the only recognized criminal hearsay exception that was well-
established at common law. However, the Court declined to decide whether the 
Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations. "If 
this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis." 
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 193, § 804.05[1] (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
56 & n.6); see also People v. Monterroso, 101 P.3d 956, 972 (Cal. 2004) (finding trial court's 
admission of dying declaration was not error, as Crawford seems to imply that the Sixth 
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Maryland Rule 5-804(b )(2) provides that statements given under belief 
of impending death are not excluded by the hearsay rule. This rule is 
broader than its federal counterpart, FRE 804(b )(2), which applies only to 
prosecution for homicide.217 Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(2), however, 
applies to "unlawful homicide, attempted homicide, or assault with intent 
to commit homicide." Both apply to civil actions.218 The justification 
for this exception, other than need, lies in the requirement that the 
declarant made the statement while believing that his or her death was 
imminent, and that the statement concerned the cause or circumstances of 
what the declarant believed to be his or her impending death. 219 Under 
this exception, such statements would qualify as a dying declaration even 
though the "dying declarant" survives, so long as: (1) the declarant is now 
unavailable to testify as a witness for any reason under Maryland Rule 5-
804( a), which could be, for example, "because of death or then existing 
physical or mental illness or injirmity,,22o caused by the attack; (2) it was 
the intent of the attacker to kill the declarant; (3) the declarant, at the time 
the statement was made, believed that death was imminent; and (4) the 
statement concerned the cause or circumstances of the declarant's 
belief.221 
There still exists a lack of guidance regarding the treatment of dying 
declarations. In his treatise on evidence, Weinstein suggests: 
Appellate courts will eventually either exclude dying declarations 
from confrontation requirements altogether or develop rules for 
determining whether a proffered dying declaration is 
"testimonial" under Crawford v. Washington. In the meantime, 
trial judges will have to determine whether to impose a 
confrontation requirement on dying declarations, and, if so, 
decide whether the Crawford requirements have been met 
concerning the particular declaration at issue.222 
Amendment does not conflict with the dying declarations excepti<;m), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 
834 (2005). 
217 Compare Md. Rule 5-804(b)(2), with FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). 
218 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) ("In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or 
proceeding . ... "); Md. Rule 5-804(b)(2) ("In a prosecution for an offense ... or in any civil 
action . ... "). 
219 Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 100 (1933) ("Fear or even belief that illness 
will end in death will not avail of itself to make a dying declaration. There must be a settled 
hopeless expectation that death is near at hand, and what is said must be spoken in the hush of 
its impending presence.") (internal citations omitted). 
220 Md. Rule 5-804(a)(4) (emphasis added). 
221 Md. Rule 5-804(b)(2). 
222 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 193, § 804.05[1] (citing Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 56 n.6 (raising, but not resolving, issues concerning dying declarations)). 
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However, courts have noted that no jurisdiction has excluded a 
testimonial dying declaration.223 Further, several states have specifically 
allowed the declaration as an exception to the rule in Crawford. 224 
In 2006, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland dealt with the 
admissibility of a dying declaration in Head v. State.225 In that case, the 
court held that a statement made by a dying declarant to a police officer 
responding to a 911 call was nontestimonial, and, thus, the defendant's 
right to cross-examination was not violated.226 The court concluded that 
"[a]ny reasonable observer would understand that [the declarant] was 
facing an ongoing emergency and that the purpose of the interrogation 
was to enable police assistance to meet that emergency.,,227 Taken as a 
whole, depending on the circumstances surrounding the declaration, some 
statements admitted as dying declarations will likely be testimonial while 
others will not.228 However, although the Court has not specifically ruled 
on this issue, it appears that even testimonial dying declarations will be 
admissible. 
223 See State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 148 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Wallace v. State, 836 
N.E.2d 985, 992-96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ("Since Crawford, we have found no jurisdiction that 
has excluded a testimonial dying declaration. Several states have specifically allowed the 
declaration as an exception to the rule in Crawford."); State v. Young, 710 N.W.2d 272,283-
84 (Minn. 2006)). 
224 See, e.g., Gardner v. State, No. AP-75, 582, 2009 WL 3365652 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 
21, 2009) (providing a useful summary of dying declarations and Crawford); Harkins v. 
Nevada, 143 P.3d 706, 711 (Nev. 2006) ("We agree with the states that recognize dying 
declarations as an exception to the Sixth Amendment confrontation right."); Wallace v. State 
836 N.E.2d 985, 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) ("[W]e are convinced that Crawford neither 
explicitly, nor impliedly, signaled that the dying declaration exception to hearsay ran afoul of 
an accused right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment."); People v. Monterroso, 101 
P.3d 956, 972 (Ca\. 2004) ("[I]f, as Crawford teaches, the confrontation clause 'is most 
naturally read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those 
exceptions established at the time of the founding,' it follows that the common law pedigree 
of the exception for dying declarations poses no conflict with the Sixth Amendment.") 
(internal citations omitted). 
225 171 Md. App. 642, 659-60, 912 A.2d 1, 11 (2006). Head v. State provides an 
excellent review of Crawford and post-Crawford cases dealing with the issues of 911 calls 
and dying declarations. In Head, the court found three facts to support its conclusion: 
First, as Officer George testified, the situation was "chaotic." Second, the scent of 
gunpowder in the air would mean to an objective observer that the crime was very 
recent and the situation was dangerous-at least potentially-because Officer 
George did not know whether the criminal who shot [the declarant] was still in the 
house. Third, immediately before he identified his attacker, [the declarant] was 
crying for help. 
Id. at 659-60,912 A.2d at 11. 
226 Id. at 659-61, 912 A.2d at 11-12. 
227 Id. at 659, 912 A.2d at 11 (quoting United States v. Clemmons, 461 F.3d 1057, 1060-
61 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
228 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004). 
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D. Rule 5-B04(b)(3) Statement Against Interest and the 
Confrontation Clause 
195 
Maryland Rule 5-804(b )(3) allows for the admissibility of out-of-court 
statements made by a declarant, which are against that declarant's 
interest, provided the declarant is unavailable as a witness. Statements 
against penal interest typically arise in criminal trials when offered by a 
defendant who claims that the declarant committed or was involved in the 
offense.229 These statements also arise when offered by the prosecution 
to establish the defendant's guilt as an accomplice of the declarant.23o 
The Maryland Rule that covers these statements, Rule 5-804(b)(3), and its 
federal counterpart, FRE 804(b)(3), are identical.231 Each is founded on 
the premise that reasonable people tend not to make statements that are 
self-inculpatory, unless they believe that those statements are true. 232 
Because statements qualifying under Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3) may 
or may not be testimonial, they require a statement-by-statement 
Confrontation Clause analysis. In Crawford, the Court specifically 
identified several examples of declarations against penal interests as 
229 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 189, § 804.06[1 ] (citing Lilly v. Virginia, 
527 U.S. 116 (1999)). 
230 ld. 
231 FRE 804(b)(3) and Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3) both currently provide: 
A statement which was at the time of its making so contrary to the declarant's 
pecuniary or propriety interest, so tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal 
liability, or ... to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a 
reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement 
unless the person believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant 
to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless 
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
In September of 2009, the Judicial Conference met and approved an amendment to FRE 
804(b)(3), which, at the time, only required a defendant to make a showing of corroborating 
circumstances. See Judicial Conference, Summary of the Report of the Judicial Conference 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 27 (September 2009), 
http://www . uscourts. gov /rules/Reports/Combined _ ST _Report _ Sept_ 2009. pdf (emphasis 
added). The proposed amendment would also "require the government to show corroborating 
circumstances as a condition for admission of an unavailable declarant's statement against 
penal interest." ld. (emphasis added). Upon approving the proposed amendment, the Judicial 
Committee transmitted the amendment to the Supreme Court for its consideration. ld. On 
Friday, April 16, 2010, the Maryland Rules Committee met to discuss the adoption of a 
conforming amendment to Maryland Rule 804(b)(3), which would amend "Rule 5-804(b)(3) 
by deleting the language 'to exculpate the accused' and adding the language 'in a criminal 
case'." See Maryland Rules Committee, Agenda for Rules Committee Meeting (April 16, 
2010), http://www.mdcourts.gov/rules/agenda/agenda.pdf. 
232 Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994). See also FED. R. EVID. 804 
advisory committee's note (citing Hileman v. Nw. Eng'g Co., 346 F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 1965)) 
("The circumstantial guarantee of reliability for declarations against interest is the assumption 
that persons do not make statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for 
good reason that they are true."). 
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testimonial.233 The Court detennined that plea allocutions were 
testimonial and inadmissible.234 Confessions of an accomplice made to 
law enforcement officers were also deemed testimonial, including those 
that do not directly implicate the defendant. 235 These types of statements 
against interest must be excluded, unless the defendant had the 
opportunity to cross-examine the unavailable declarant.236 If the 
statements do not fall under one of the examples described in Crawford, 
judges and practitioners should examine the statement to detennine 
whether or not it is testimonial.237 
Whether a statement is, in fact, so contrary to the declarant's interest 
such that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have 
made the statement is a preliminary detennination to be made by the 
court, based on the circumstances of each case.238 In Maryland, 
preliminary detenninations by the court regarding questions of 
admissibility of evidence are governed by Rule 5-104(a), which allows 
the court to "decline to require strict application of the rules of evidence, 
except those relating to privilege and the competency of the witness." 
During the preliminary detennination, when statements made by an 
unavailable declarant who is subject to criminal prosecution are offered 
against an accused, the declarant's motivation for making the statement 
will be strictly scrutinized.239 This rule does not, however, attempt to 
codify the constitutional principle articulated in Bruton v. United 
States,240 concerning statements of co-defendants offered at a joint trial 
against a co-defendant. There, the Court ruled that, at a joint trial, the 
admission of a co-defendant's confession that implicated the defendant 
233 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 65. 
234 Id. at 64-65. 
235 Id. at 63-64. 
236 Id. at 65. 
237 See supra Part 1I.F. 
238 FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee's note. The advisory committee's note for FRE 
804 states: 
Thus a statement admitting guilt and implicating another person, made while in 
custody, may well be motivated by a desire to curry favor with the authorities and 
hence fail to qualify as against interest. On the other hand, the same words spoken 
under different circumstances, e.g., to an acquaintance, would have no difficulty in 
qualifying. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). For cases discussing declarations against penal interest, see 
State v. Matusky, 343 Md. 467, 682 A.2d 694 (1996); Stewart v. State, 151 Md. App. 425, 
827 A.2d 850 (2003); Nero v. State, 144 Md. App. 333, 798 A.2d 5 (2002). 
239 See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 1980). 
240 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126, 137 (1968). 
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violated that defendant's Sixth Amendment to confront his accusers. 241 
That issue continues to be governed by constitutional law. 242 
A statement containing both self-serving and disserving declarations 
may be admitted in it its entirety, if the two statements are related and the 
statement considered in its entirety is sufficiently trustworthy to establish 
that the statement is against the declarant's interest.243 This exception 
requires corroborating circumstances clearly indicating the 
trustworthiness of an against-penal-interest statement only if the 
statement is offered to exculpate the accused.244 However, because of 
Sixth Amendment confrontation concerns, courts, even before Crawford, 
have imposed a similar corroboration/trustworthiness requirement upon 
statements inculpating the accused, as well. 245 
E. Rule 5-804(b)(4) Statement of Personal or Family History and the 
Confrontation Clause 
The Maryland and Federal rules concerning statements of personal or 
family history, Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(4) and FRE 804(b)(4), are 
virtually identical.246 The rationale for admissibility rests on the premise 
that a declarant will not make a statement about the matters covered in 
the exception unless it is trustworthy. 247 Both rules govern statements 
made by the declarant concerning, among other things, the declarant's 
own birth; adoption; marriage; legitimacy; ancestry; or relation by blood, 
adoption, or marriage, even though the declarant lacked personal 
knowledge of these matters.248 As such statements are those made by the 
declarant and which generally concern only the declarant, it would seem 
241 Jd. 
242 Jd.; see also Oliver, 626 F.2d at 261 n.9. 
243 McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, § 804(3):I(d) (2001) (citing State v. 
Matusky, 343 Md. 467,478-82,682 A.2d 694, 699-701 (1996) (detailed discussion); State v. 
Standi fur, 310 Md. 3, 16-17,526 A.2d 955,961-62 (1987)); see also Stewart v. State, 151 Md. 
App. 425, 827 A.2d 850 (2003), cert. denied, 377 Md. 276, 833 A.2d 32 (2003). 
244 Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422,428-29 (1961), aff'd, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see also Gray 
v. State, 368 Md. 529, 796 A.2d 697 (2002). See supra note 23lfor discussion of proposed 
amendments to both FRE 804(b )(3) and Maryland Rule 804(b )(3), which would extend the 
corroboration requirement to the government. 
245 Williamson, 512 U.S. 594 (1994) (not reaching issue); United States v. Costa, 31 F.3d 
1073 (II th Cir. 1994); United States v. Harty, 930 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 894 (1991); United States v. Condolini, 870 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1989); see Rebecca L. 
Dubin, Recent Decision, 343 Md. 467, 682 A.2d 694 (1996), 57 MD. L. REV. 838 (1998) 
(discussing admissibility of non-self-inculpatory statements that are not within declaration 
against interest) 
246 Compare Md. Rule 5-804(b)(4), with FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(4). 
247 McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, § 804(4):1 (discussing admissibility 
of statements of personal or family history). 
248 Md. Rule 5-804(b)(4); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(4). 
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unlikely that the Confrontation Clause would be offended. 249 
Nevertheless, statements made by a declarant describing his or her 
personal or family history may be inculpatory of an accused.250 While 
infrequent, they may require a confrontation analysis to consider whether 
or not the statement is testimonia1.251 Statements regarding alienage, for 
example, have been found to be testimonial. 252 
F. Rule 5-B04(b)(5)(B) Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and the 
Confrontation Clause 
In Crawford, the Supreme Court specifically accepted the rule of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing and held that it extinguishes Confrontation 
Clause claims on essentially equitable grounds.253 However, in Giles v. 
Calijornia,254 the Court limited the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine for 
confrontation purposes. In that case, the Court considered whether 
testimonial statements made by a murder victim to police before she was 
killed were admissible under the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine. 255 At 
common law, the Court noted, there were two forms of testimonial 
statements that were admissible even though there was no confrontation: 
(1) dying declarations and (2) statements of a witness who was 
"detained" or "kept away" by means or procurement of the defendant.256 
This second exception, also known as forfeiture by wrongdoing, required 
that the defendant engage in conduct specifically designed to prevent the 
witness from testifying.257 Applying this reasoning to the facts of the 
case, the Court determined that, because it was not shown that the 
appellant murdered the victim with the intention of preventing her from 
testifying at trial, the statements were inadmissible.258 
In criminal cases, the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing allows the 
admissibility of statements made by declarants whose unavailability to 
testify was wrongfully procured by any party-the defendant or 
249 But see United States v. Gonzalez-Marichal, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 
2004) (granting a motion in limine to "exclude an unavailable material witness's statement 
made during custodial interrogation about her alienage on the ground that admission of the 
statement violates Defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights"). 
250 See Id. at 1202-03 (finding statements regarding declarant's alienage to be testimonial 
in nature). 
251 See supra Part II.F. 
252 Gonzalez-Marichal, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1202-03. 
253 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) ("[T]he rule of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing ... extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not 
purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability."); see also Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006). 
254 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008). 
255 ld. at 2681-82. 
256 ld. at 2682-83. 
257 ld. at 2683. 
258 ld. at 2693. 
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prosecution.259 A defendant who causes a witness to be unavailable may 
act personally or through others.26o It is sufficient "if the wrongdoing 
leading to the witness's unavailability was 'in furtherance, within the 
scope, and reasonably foreseeable as a necessary and natural consequence 
of an ongoing conspiracy' between the defendant and the wrongdoer.,,261 
Wrongdoing includes "coercion, undue influence, or pressure to silence 
testimony.,,262 A defendant who wrongfully procures the unavailability 
of a witness may forfeit objections based on both hearsay and Sixth 
Amendment confrontation grounds. 263 
While both the federal and state rules allow for the admission of 
hearsay statements in which a witness is unavailable because of a party's 
wrongdoing, the processes for determining whether a defendant has 
caused a witness to be unavailable differ significantly. The federal rule 
for forfeiture by wrongdoing, FRE 804(b)( 6), admits a statement if the 
declarant is unavailable and the statement is "offered against a party that 
has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, 
procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness." Maryland, 
however, has not adopted FRE 804(b)(6) into its rules of evidence in 
criminal causes.264 Instead, when the witness is unavailable due to a 
party's wrongdoing, Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(5)(B) provides that 
admission of the witness' statements shall be governed by section 10-901 
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code.265 
As demonstrated below, the result is considerably more restrictive than 
under FRE 804(b)(6). 
1. Federal Approach to Forfeiture by Wrongdoing. 
FRE 804(b)( 6) provides that a "statement offered against a party that 
has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, 
procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness" will not be 
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a 
witness?66 For a statement to be admissible under FRE 804(b)(6), the 
259 30B MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 7078 (2006 & Supp. 
2009). 
260 Id. 
261 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 193, § 804.03[7][a] (quoting United 
States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820 (lOth Cir. 2000)). 
262 United States v. Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2002). 
263 Id. at 762. 
264 Witness unavailability by wrongdoing in civil cases is discussed in Maryland Rule 5-
804(b )(5)(A). 
265 See generally MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-901 (2006). 
266 Rule intended as a "prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent behavior 'which strikes at 
the heart of the system of justice itself.' " FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's note 
(quoting United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467 
U.S. 1204 (1984)). 
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following is required: (1) the declarant must be unavailable as a witness; 
(2) the statement must be offered against a party that has "engaged in or 
acquiesced in" wrongdoing; (3) the wrongdoing must have been intended 
to, and did, procure the unavailability of the witness;267 and (4) there must 
be a nexus between the defendant's wrongful acts and the unavailability 
of the witness (the wrongdoing need not be criminal activity). It is 
important to note that the statement need not be one that is given under 
oath or written, nor signed by the declarant. 
Under the federal rules, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine applies 
to all parties, including the government, and there appears to be no 
limitation as to the type of criminal cause to which the rule applies. 268 
There is no requirement to notify opposing counsel of intent to introduce 
the statement. Additionally, a hearing for the purpose of making a 
preliminary determination under FRE 104(a), regarding whether the 
defendant caused declarant's unavailability as a witness, is not required; 
however, the majority of federal courts allow a hearing. 269 Where a 
hearing is permitted, when making preliminary determinations under FRE 
104(a), the rules of evidence are relaxed and need not apply, except with 
respect to privilege.270 Finally, the standard of proof required for 
preliminary determinations of forfeiture by wrongdoing is preponderance 
of the evidence. 
2. Maryland Approach to Forfeiture by Wrongdoing. 
As noted, in Maryland, preliminary determinations by the court 
regarding questions of admissibility of evidence, ordinarily, are governed 
by Rule 5-104(a). When analyzing statements falling under the forfeiture 
by wrongdoing exception, however, Maryland courts employ Rule 5-
804(b)(5) and section 10-901 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
267 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2687-88 (2008) (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
268 See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's note. 
269 Hearing out of the presence not required. See United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 
926 (8th Cir. 1982) (court held that trial court need not conduct independent evidentiary 
hearing but may admit testimonial hearsay of an unavailable witness "contingent upon proof 
of the underlying murder by a preponderance of the evidence"-which may be established 
during trial). This is similar to conditional relevance FRE 1 04(b) determination and FRE 403 
judicial economy considerations that courts apply when determining whether to admit hearsay 
statements of co-conspirators. See United States v. Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 356 (4th Cir. 
2000) (sufficient evidence presented during trial to establish the defendant caused 
unavailability of witness without necessity of evidentiary hearing). 
270 FED. R. EVID. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning the ... admissibility of 
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In 
making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to 
privileges.") (emphasis added). 
2010] The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule 201 
Article.271 The former adopts the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing as 
an exception to the hearsay rule.272 The latter provides a statutory 
procedure for determining when this exception applies. 273 The 
requirements of this statute differ significantly from those under FRE 
804(b)(6). 
For a statement to be admissible under section 10-901 of the Courts 
and Judicial Proceedings Article, the declarant must be unavailable as a 
witness, and the statement can only be offered against a party that is 
charged with a felonious crime of violence or felonious narcotics 
distribution. Unlike the federal rule, a statement may not be admitted 
under this section unless it was (1) "[g]iven under oath subject to the 
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing or other proceeding or in a 
deposition"; (2) [rJeduced to writing and signed by the declarant"; or (3) 
"[r]ecorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic or 
electronic means contemporaneously with the making of the 
statement.,,274 In addition to requiring the higher clear and convincing 
standard for statements admitted under this doctrine, the statute mandates 
that courts apply the Maryland Rules of Evidence strictly. 275 
The statute also requires notice.276 As soon as is practicable after the 
proponent of the statement learns that the declarant will be unavailable, 
the proponent must notify the adverse party of: (1) "[t]he intention to 
offer the statement"; (2) "[t]he particulars of the statement"; and (3) 
"[t]he identity of the witness through whom the statement is offered.,,277 
It is only when all of these conditions have been met that a statement may 
be offered as an exception under Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(5)(B). As 
demonstrated by a higher standard of proof, a stricter application of the 
rules of evidence, and a notice requirement, the Maryland Rule and its 
corresponding statute are much more restrictive than their federal 
counterpart. 
271 Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5)(B) ("In criminal causes in which a witness is unavailable 
because of a party's wrongdoing, admission of the witness's statement under this exception is 
governed by [Maryland Code, Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article], § 10-901."); see also 
Byron L. Warnken, "Forfeiture by Wrongdoing" After Crawford v. Washington: Maryland's 
Approach Best Preserves the Right to Confrontation, 37 U. BALT. L. REv. 203,241-44 (2008); 
Tracey L. Perrick, Comment, Crawford v. Washington: Redefining Sixth Amendment 
Jurisprudence; The Impact Across the United States and in Maryland, 35 U. BALT. L. REv. 
133, 134 n.lO (2005) (noting that "the Maryland General Assembly codified the common law 
rule offorfeiture, adopting a statute that incorporates by reference Maryland Rule 5-804"). 
272 McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 107, § 804(6): I (b) (Supp. 2009). 
273 See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-90 I (2006). 
274 Jd. at § 10-90 I (c)(I). 
275 Jd. at § 10-90 I (b)(I). 
276 Id. at § 1O-901(c)(2). 
277 Id. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Given the frequency with which the Supreme Court and Maryland 
appellate courts have issued opinions regarding the contours of the 
Confrontation Clause since the publication of Crawford in 2004, it is fair 
to predict that they will continue to do so for the foreseeable future, at 
least until the many unanswered questions about the effect of the 
Confrontation Clause on the admissibility of hearsay in criminal cases 
have been resolved. Recognizing this, as well as the challenges presented 
to trial judges and lawyers who often must deal with these issues "on the 
fly" during trial, we have attempted to provide practical and useful 
guidelines that should lead to correct rulings and fair outcomes at trial. 
Reduced to its essentials, the Confrontation Clause precludes 
introduction as evidence against a defendant in a criminal trial statements 
that are testimonial unless the declarant is unavailable, and the defendant 
has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. However, 
even statements that are deemed to be testimonial and for which there 
was no prior opportunity for cross-examination may be admitted against a 
defendant. In such instances, the Confrontation Clause will not be 
violated if the defendant has forfeited his confrontation rights by his 
wrongdoing, waived them by failing to object to the introduction of the 
statement, or by failing to comply with statues imposing a duty to notify 
the prosecution that the defendant intends to object to the introduction of 
out of court testimonial statements, such as laboratory reports, unless the 
declarant who made them testifies. 
With regard to hearsay statements that fall within recognized 
exceptions to the general rule excluding hearsay, certain exceptions, such 
as those found at Maryland Rule 5-802.1 always will meet Confrontation 
Clause requirements because they require the presence of the declarant at 
trial to insure the opportunity for cross-examination. Others, such as 
Rule 5-803(a) admissions by a party-opponent usually will be 
nontestimonial. Other hearsay exceptions, such as those found at 
Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(6) will withstand Confrontation Clause 
challenges, even if the defendant does not testify, if they are not properly 
classified as "testimonial" because, objectively viewed, when made, it 
was not reasonably foreseeable that they would be used in future criminal 
proceedings. As to these exceptions, no per se rule can be stated; rather, 
a fact-intensive case-by-case analysis will be required to differentiate 
testimonial from nontestimonial statements. Among the 5-803(b) 
exceptions, those falling into the category dealing with the declarant's 
perceptions, state of mind, emotion, intent, and physical or mental 
condition often will not be testimonial because they will have been made 
under circumstances that make it unlikely that, objectively viewed, it was 
foreseeable that they would see future use as evidence in criminal 
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proceedings. For those for which such use reasonably is foreseeable, 
however, they will be classified as testimonial, and, therefore, excluded 
under the Confrontation Clause, unless the declarant is unavailable, and 
there was a prior opportunity for cross-examination, unless confrontation 
rights have been forfeited or waived. 
As for the vast array of Maryland Rule 5-803(b) hearsay exceptions 
that deal with various documents, records and writings, some, such a 
business and public records, will be deemed to be testimonial, or not, 
based on the purpose underlying their creation. If made for routine use 
by the entity or person for whose benefit they were created, they can be 
expected to be nontestimonial. If, however, prepared for purposes of use 
in criminal proceedings, such as crime lab or similar forensic records, 
they will be testimonial and subject to the restrictions of the 
Confrontation Clause. For these hearsay exceptions, the key 
determinative factor is to avoid reliance on labels such as "business" or 
"public" records, but instead to focus on the purpose underlying the 
particular record's creation. Specifically, the essential question is 
whether the document or record was prepared for the purpose of proving 
factual matters in a criminal case. If evidentiary use is reasonably 
foreseeable at the time of preparation, then, once again, the restrictions of 
the Confrontation Clause will apply. Finally, Maryland Rule 5-803(b) 
exceptions dealing with reputation evidence have in common the indicia 
of having been made under circumstances that usually will result in a 
finding that they are not testimonial. 
The five hearsay exceptions found at Maryland Rule 5-804(b) all 
involve unavailable declarants and will be exempt from Confrontation 
Clause restrictions only if not testimonial, again requiring case-by-case 
evaluation. Of these exceptions, prior testimony of an unavailable 
declarant always will meet Confrontation Clause requirements because 
the declarant will have had to have been available for cross-examination 
at the earlier trial or court proceeding. Dying declarations could be 
deemed to be testimonial or nontestimonial, depending on the 
circumstances surrounding their making, but they may also be sui generis 
exceptions to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause because they 
were well recognized at common law at the time of the enactment of the 
Sixth Amendment. Statements of unavailable declarants that are against 
their penal, proprietary, or pecuniary interests when made may be 
testimonial, or not, depending on the circumstances surrounding their 
making, and the foreseeability of their being used in subsequent criminal 
proceedings. Statements of personal or family history, which generally 
are unlikely to pose a confrontation problem, may sometimes be 
testimonial, as was the case in Gonzalez-Marichal, where the hearsay 
statement of an unavailable witness that she was a Mexican citizen at the 
time she was illegally transported into the United States-an essential 
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element of transportation of illegal immigrants-was found to be 
testimonial. And, finally, when the strict procedural requirements of 
Maryland Rule 5-804(b )(5)(B) have been satisfied, then the statement of 
an unavailable declarant may be admitted against a defendant without 
violating the Confrontation Clause, if the declarants' unavailability was 
procured by the defendant's own misconduct, which results in the 
forfeiture of confrontation rights. 
It is hoped that our ambitions in writing this article have been fulfilled, 
and that it will provide a practical and helpful guide for judges and 
lawyers charged with applying the rules of evidence in criminal cases, for 
whom we have the greatest respect and highest regard. 
